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Executive Summary 
 
1. Executive Summary 
 
1.1. This report brings together the available evidence from research into the 
New Deal for people aged 25 and over (ND25 plus). It covers both qualitative 
and quantitative analysis and new analysis of administrative data for clients 
who have participated in ND25 plus over the last four years. 
 
1.2. ND25 plus is part of a wider “Welfare to Work” strategy. It has two key 
objectives. First to help long-term unemployed people into jobs and to improve 
their prospects of staying and progressing in employment. Second to increase 
the long-term employability of long-term unemployed people.  
 
 
The operation and evolution of the programme  
 
1.3. The national ND25 plus programme has gone through three distinct 
phases of operation termed the original programme (June 1998-April 2000), 
the enhanced programme (April 2000-April 2001) and the re-engineered 
programme (April 2001 – present day). In addition, a number of pilots 
operated in 28 areas between November 1998 and March 2001.  
 
1.4. Under the original programme, client entry to the programme typically 
occurred at an annual restart interview for those with at least 2 years 
continuous Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claim. The main thrust of the 
provision was a system called the Advisory Interview Process (AIP) that 
operated for between three and six months and involved a series of 
mandatory interviews with New Deal Personal Advisers (NDPAs) and the 
opportunity to access a range of employment or training opportunities. After 
the AIP there was the possibility to enter a Follow-through process that 
consisted of a further series of interviews with NDPAs.  
 
1.5. The programme was enhanced in April 2000, with changes designed to 
bring more structure to the AIP and to increase the pace of the programme. 
The AIP was limited to four months and renamed the New Deal Gateway. 
Changes to the Gateway included additional and more regular interviews with 
NDPAs and an improved assessment of client needs focusing particularly on 
Basic Skills needs and identification of barriers to employment.  
 
1.6. In the pilot areas entry occurred after 12 months continuous JSA claim in 
some areas and after 18 months continuous JSA claim in other areas. In all 
areas there was a common framework that involved a Gateway of 6-17 
weeks, typically 13 weeks. This was followed by a mandatory referral to an 
Intensive Activity Period (IAP), which consisted of 13 weeks activity. The 
provision continued with a mandatory Follow-through period for those leaving 
IAP.  
 
1.7. In April 2001, radical changes were made to the provision. These 
changes brought the programme more in line with the pilot provision 
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described above and also closer to the provision offered under New Deal for 
Young People (NDYP). The main changes were that eligibility was widened to 
cover JSA claimants with 18 months continuous unemployment or 18 months 
out of the last 21 months unemployment, and mandatory participation was 
extended to stages beyond the Gateway for all participants aged 25-49. For 
people aged 50 plus participation beyond the Gateway remained voluntary. 
Following the Gateway a new IAP was introduced and was designed to offer 
flexible and individually tailored packages of support. There were also 
refinements to the Follow-through to improve the focus and pace of this phase 
of the programme.  
 
1.8. The impact of the April 2000 enhancements was felt to have been 
beneficial, but the overall effect was marginal. The April 2001 programme re-
engineering brought greater flexibility to Advisers that was welcomed in areas 
where the national provision had been operating, but in pilot areas the re-
engineered programme was perceived to be less flexible than pilot provision. 
Entry to IAP increased under the re-engineered programme, as did moves 
into unsubsidised employment and transfers to other benefits.  
 
1.9. The general impressions about Follow-through were negative with 
NDPAs typically reporting few signs that job outcomes occur during the 
Follow-through stage. Follow-through entrants had a wide variety of needs 
depending on what had been achieved earlier on the programme. 
 
1.10. In the pilots, participants were positive about joining an IAP where they 
felt they had a degree of choice over what activity they did and when it was 
relevant to their needs. Dissatisfaction arose when participants felt they were 
“time-filling” or repeating courses done previously on other programmes. Work 
experience placements with employers were a successful feature of the IAP in 
the pilots and adopted in the re-engineered programme. The employment 
subsidy was generally well received, however, Education and Training 
Opportunities were often felt not to be meeting client needs.  
 
1.11. Roughly a third of all IAP entrants in the re-engineered programme went 
into employment related opportunities and in the original and enhanced 
programmes around a half went into WBLA. For the re-engineered 
programme a third of IAP entrants undertook IAP Training and one in six 
undertook BET or Basic Skills training. For most activities, the vast majority of 
leavers went into Follow-through.  
 
 
Advisers, Employers and Training Providers 
 
1.12. NDPAs play a key role in all aspects of the programme with the 
experience of NDPAs leading to positive programme changes. Training for 
NDPAs was often felt to be disappointing, particularly when their role was 
expanding. However, they welcomed the greater flexibility open to them once 
the programme was re-engineered in April 2001. 
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1.13. Employers play a key role in the success of ND25 plus. Many employers 
were motivated by the reduction in costs from the employment subsidy and in 
general employers felt the size of the subsidy was about right in terms of 
covering additional costs and making long-term unemployed recruits 
economically viable.  
 
1.14. With the introduction of the re-engineered programme providers became 
more important, particularly with the routeway model of delivery. Early on in 
this phase of the programme, Advisers were often unclear about the available 
provision, and often relied heavily on routeway providers.  
 
 
The impact of ND25 plus 
 
1.15. There were a little below half a million ND25 plus entrants between June 
1998 and June 2002. Around one in six entrants were women, around three-
quarters were aged 25-49 and over time there was an increasing percentage 
of entrants from ethnic minorities and from people with a disability. For 
leavers, around one half returned to claim JSA, whilst roughly one in six went 
into unsubsidised employment.  
 
1.16. The macroeconomic assessment of ND25 plus found that for men, 
ND25 plus participants were four percentage points less likely to be 
unemployed 12 months after entering the programme than if it had not been 
introduced. For women, the impact was negligible. In the pilots, roughly eight 
per cent more pilot participants had left JSA 18 months after entering ND25 
plus than members of a comparison group. There was some evidence that 
pilot participants were more likely to leave JSA to go into work. There was no 
evidence of any increase in a range of measures of employability and mixed 
evidence on the quality of jobs achieved by pilot participants.  
 
1.17. Early entry was associated with more programme participation and 
better outcomes. However, such differences may be due to early entrants 
having greater motivation to participate in ND25 plus and also to get work. 
However, participants with longer unemployment duration were less likely to 
stay on the programme beyond the Gateway, and less likely to go into 
employment.  
 
1.18. Older participants entering an IAP opportunity were more likely to enter 
subsidised employment and less likely to participate in a work experience 
placement. The percentage of ND25 plus leavers going into unsubsidised 
employment declined with age. Older participants were also more likely to 
transfer to other benefits. The pattern of participation was similar between 
whites and ethnic minorities. However, fewer ethnic minority IAP entrants 
went into subsidised employment than White IAP entrants and more ethnic 
minority IAP entrants went into IAP training and BET or basic skills courses. 
Despite these differences the pattern of exit destinations were fairly similar.  
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Conclusions 
 
1.19. The re-engineered programme introduced in April 2001 addressed some 
of the identified problems with the earlier programmes creating an individually 
tailored package of provision for participants and greater flexibility for 
Advisers. The change to mandatory programme participation after the 
Gateway meant that many more participants took an active role in the 
programme through participation in the IAP. There remain some concerns 
regarding the Follow-through stage of the programme with clients having 
variable requirements from this stage of the programme dependent on the 
extent of their overall needs and what had been achieved earlier in the 
programme.  
 
4 
Introduction 
2. Introduction 
 
2.1. This report brings together the available evidence from research into the 
New Deal for people aged 25 and over (ND25 plus). The research covers 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis arises from 
interviews with ND25 plus participants, employers, New Deal Personal 
Advisers (NDPAs), and service providers. The quantitative analysis examines 
administrative data about participants plus data from surveys of participants 
and non-participants.  
 
2.2. The report also provides some new analysis of administrative data to 
highlight the mechanics of the programme and differences in outcomes for 
different client groups who have participated in ND25 plus over the last four 
years.  
 
2.3. In addition, the report utilises summaries from a day of workshops held at 
the Policy Studies Institute in December 2002. Further details of which are 
provided in the appendix.  
 
2.4. The report draws heavily on existing summary reports about ND25 plus 
(Hasluck, 2000 and 2002), but also considers other research not included in 
these summaries. In particular it covers a review of the quantitative evaluation 
evidence from complex surveys of ND25 plus participants and non-
participants designed to assess the net impact of the programme. 
 
 
Policy objectives 
 
2.5. ND25 plus is part of a wider “Welfare to Work” strategy designed to assist 
specific groups to take up paid work. The programme is targeted at 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants and has two key objectives: 
 
• To help long-term unemployed people into jobs and to improve their 
prospects of staying and progressing in employment; and 
 
• To increase the long-term employability of long-term unemployed 
people, thereby making a positive contribution to sustainable levels of 
employment and to a reduction in social exclusion. 
 
 
ND25 plus policy history 
 
2.6. The first of the New Deal programmes came into existence with a 
prototype programme for lone parents (NDLP) in July 1997 followed by the 
national introduction of NDLP in October 1998 (see Evans et al, 2002 for 
further details about NDLP). Similarly, New Deal for Young People (NDYP), a 
programme targeted at JSA claimants aged 18-24 with unemployment 
duration of six months or more, was introduced in a number of Pathfinder 
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areas in January 1998. Three months later in April 1998 the national NDYP 
programme was launched.  
 
2.7. ND25 plus was subsequently introduced nationally in June 1998 for 
claimants of JSA who were aged 25 and over with 24 months of continuous 
unemployment. A few months later, in November 1998, twenty-eight local pilot 
projects were instigated. These pilots had the same objectives as national 
ND25 plus but also aimed to test the effectiveness of a range of new 
approaches to helping the long-term unemployed back to work. Specifically, 
the pilots had been designed to test the effectiveness of intervening after 12 
months and 18 months of unemployment and to try out a range of innovative 
approaches to enhancing the employability of the long-term unemployed.  
 
2.8. In April 2000, the national programme was enhanced in the light of 
evidence from the operation of the existing programmes. In April 2001 the 
pilot projects ended and the national programme was re-engineered with 
changes to the available provision becoming more in line with that available in 
the pilots and in NDYP.  
 
2.9. The key milestones in relation to the evolution of these New Deal 
programmes are highlighted in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Table 2.1 New Deal Milestones 
July 1997 Prototype NDLP introduced 
January 1998 NDYP introduced in Pathfinder areas 
April 1998 NDYP introduced nationally 
June 1998 ND25 plus introduced nationally  
October 1998 NDLP introduced nationally 
November 1998 ND25 plus introduced in Pilot areas 
April 2000 ND25 plus Enhanced Provision introduced in National 
areas. 
April 2001 ND25 plus Re-Engineered Provision introduced in all 
areas. 
 
 
Outline of report  
 
2.10. This report covers both national and pilot provision and considers the 
three phases of national provision. It is structured as follows. In Section Three 
the operation and evolution of the programme is considered. The role and 
perceptions of NDPAs in ND25 plus are considered in Section Four, and 
those of employers and providers in Section Five. Section Six looks at 
estimates of the overall impact of the programme, whilst Section Seven 
provides summary details about ND25 plus participants and the impact of the 
programme for different client groups. Section Eight concludes. 
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3. The operation and evolution of the ND25 
plus programme 
 
3.1. The national ND25 plus programme has gone through three distinct 
phases of operation with the provision offered to participants under all the 
phases broadly following the framework of provision offered in other New Deal 
programmes. Many of the changes that have been instigated over time came 
about as a result of evidence about the operation of the national programme, 
the pilot programmes and the operation of NDYP. These changes are 
explored in this section of the report. For ease of description, the three distinct 
phases of national provision are termed hereafter Original, Enhanced and Re-
engineered programmes. The provision available under each phase is 
discussed in some detail below together with details of the framework for 
provision available in the pilot areas.  
 
 
The Original National Programme 
 
3.2. The Original National Programme was available from June 1998 up to 
March 2000. Entry to the programme occurred at an annual restart interview 
for those with at least 2 years continuous JSA claim, with some early entry 
possibilities for clearly disadvantaged jobseekers.  
 
3.3. The main thrust of the provision was a system called the Advisory 
Interview Process (AIP) that operated for between three and six months and 
involved a series of mandatory interviews with NDPAs. These were focused 
on improving employability, enhancing job search and, if possible, finding 
unsubsidised employment.  
 
3.4. During the AIP the client may access a range of other opportunities, 
although participation in such opportunities was voluntary. These included a 
period of subsidised employment lasting six months; a course of full-time 
education or training up to 12 months whilst remaining on JSA, termed 
Education and Training Opportunities (ETO); transfer to other existing 
provision, for example Work Based Learning for Adults. 
  
3.5. For those that did not secure employment during the AIP they would 
return to normal Jobseeker activity and re-enter ND25 plus at their next restart 
interview.  
 
3.6. Following the AIP opportunities described above, there was the possibility 
to enter a Follow-through process that consisted of a further series of 
interviews with NDPAs to help participants find jobs. Again this stage of the 
programme was not compulsory, but was available to those who left ND25 
plus and returned to claim JSA within 13 weeks or those who completed or 
left subsidised employment, ETO or existing provision.  
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The Enhanced National Programme 
 
3.7. The programme was enhanced in April 2000, with changes designed to 
bring more structure to the AIP and to increase the pace of the programme. 
Under the enhanced national programme the AIP was limited to four months 
and renamed the New Deal Gateway bringing it into line with other New Deal 
provision. 
 
3.8. Changes to the Gateway involved additional and more regular interviews 
with NDPAs and additional case conferences to facilitate meaningful action 
plans. There was an improved assessment of client needs focusing particular 
on basic skills needs and identification of barriers to employment. Also 
introduced were specialist careers guidance and mentoring and a jobseekers 
grant. Other changes highlighted a renewed emphasis on client 
responsibilities as a jobseeker. The AIP/Gateway opportunities were also 
expanded to include externally contracted provision not previously available 
through ND25 plus including soft skills and key skills courses.  
 
 
The framework for pilot provision 
 
3.9. In the pilot areas entry to ND25 plus occurred after 12 months continuous 
JSA claim in some areas and after 18 months continuous JSA claim in other 
areas. In all areas there was a common framework that involved a Gateway of 
6-17 weeks, typically 13 weeks. This was followed by a mandatory referral to 
an Intensive Activity Period (IAP), which consisted of 13 weeks activity not 
dissimilar to that available as part of the Gateway under the original national 
programme. The provision continued with a mandatory Follow-through period 
for those leaving IAP. In all pilot areas innovative approaches to enhancing 
employability were encouraged including new types of provision, additional 
payments to participants and variations to subsidy payments.  
 
 
The Re-Engineered National Programme 
 
3.10. In April 2001 more radical changes were made to the programme to 
what has been labelled the re-engineered national programme. This is the 
model currently in operation and covers all areas of the UK, as the pilots 
ceased to operate from the beginning of April 2001. These changes brought 
the programme more in line with the pilot provision described above and also 
closer to the provision offered under NDYP.  
 
3.11. The main changes were that eligibility was widened to cover JSA 
claimants with 18 months continuous unemployment or 18 months out of the 
last 21 months unemployment, and mandatory participation was extended to 
stages beyond the Gateway for all participants aged 25-49. For people aged 
50 or more participation beyond the Gateway remained voluntary.  
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3.12. Following the Gateway a new IAP was introduced designed to offer 
flexible and individually tailored packages of support. A range of opportunities 
was available including work experience, work placements with employers, 
work-focused training, Basic Employability Training (BET), self-employment 
support, help with motivation and soft skills. Education and Training 
Opportunities of up to 12 months duration remained available for a small 
number of participants. All packages were underpinned by intensive job 
search to help people move into work as quickly as possible. The IAP ran for 
a minimum of 13 weeks, but could be extended up to 26 weeks.  
 
3.13. There were also refinements to the Follow-through to improve the focus 
and pace of this phase of the programme. Follow-through participants would 
typically spend a period of six weeks on intensive job search designed to build 
upon the experience gained in the IAP. There was the possibility that the 
Follow-through could be extended to 13 weeks.  
 
 
ND25 plus Participants 
 
3.14. The New Deal Evaluation Database (NDED) includes a record of a little 
below half a million ND25 plus entrants between June 1998 and June 2002 
with a quarterly pattern of entrants shown in Figure 3.1. On average there 
were a little over 30,000 entrants per quarter. The rate of entry was highest 
when the programme began in 1998, but fell steadily for much of 1999 before 
another entry peak in the final quarter of 1999. The entry rate was lowest in 
2000, under the enhanced national programme with on average 25,000 
entrants per quarter. Once the eligibility period fell to 18 months in April 2001, 
entry increased for a while, but soon returned to around 25,000 entrants per 
quarter in 2002. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 New Deal Entrants by Quarter. 
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3.15. If we consider the different phases of ND25 plus there were roughly 
250,000 entrants to the original programme up to the end of March 2000, 
followed by roughly 100,000 entrants to the enhanced programme between 
April 2000 and March 2001. By the end of June 2002 there were 143,000 
entrants to the re-engineered programme that began in April 2001.  
 
3.16. At the end of June 2002 there were roughly 54,000 people still on ND25 
plus meaning that almost 450,000 participants had left the programme. Figure 
3.2 plots the number of leavers by quarter in the same way as Figure 3.1 
plotted the entrants. There were fewer leavers per quarter in 1998 as the 
programme was still to become established. The number of leavers increased 
to a peak of 38,000 per quarter in the first half of 2000. From the middle of 
2000 the number of exits was much more stable at around 30,000 per quarter.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 New Deal Leavers by Quarter   
.17. For the leavers we can identify their destination on leaving ND25 plus. 
.18. Except under the re-engineered programme the largest group of ND25 
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Figure 3.3 shows the percentage leaving to each of five destinations for all 
leavers, and leavers from each of the three phases of the programme.  
 
3
plus leavers return to claim JSA. Overall, this constitutes roughly a half of all 
leavers, but is slightly higher from the original and enhanced programmes. 
Leavers from the re-engineered programme are less likely to leave ND25 pl
to return to claim JSA partly because of the mandatory nature of the IAP and 
also because this phase of the programme was more successful in placing 
participants in unsubsidised employment.  
 
3
unsubsidised employment compared with 14 per cent from the original 
programme and 16 per cent from the enhanced programme. These figu
give an indication of the relative success of the three phases of the ND25 pl
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programme against one of the objectives of the programme: helping the long-
term unemployed into jobs.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Destinations of ND25 plus Leavers 
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3
other destinations was larger than under the earlier programmes. There ar
also a significant number of leavers whose destination is reported as 
“unknown”. Because of these the percentage recorded as having term
their JSA claim in order to go into a job will be an undercount of the total 
number going into a job. Some who go into a job will not record this as the
reason for termination of their JSA claim. O’Donnell (2001) when looking at 
exits to unknown destinations in NDYP indicates that the destinations of thos
who do not give a reason for termination follow a similar pattern to those who 
do give a reason.  
 
 
T
 
3
of operation and some headline outcome figures, the focus of the remainder 
of this section is the different elements of ND25 plus under each of the three 
phases. 
 
3
create greater flexibility and increase the range of provision available to 
clients. Molloy and Ritchie (2000) and Winterbotham et al (2001) reporte
these changes resulted in improved job search skills, expanded or more 
focused job search, new or updated skills and qualifications, together with
emotional and psychological benefits including increased morale, confidenc
and motivation to find work.  
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3.23. A second desired enhancement was to increase the pace of the 
programme. The maximum length of the AIP was reduced from six to four 
months and this stage of the programme was renamed the Gateway. Given 
the reduction in maximum time we would expect to see some reduction in 
average time on the programme for Gateway leavers. 
 
3.24. Figure 3.4 shows that the average number of months on ND25 plus for 
those leaving during the Gateway fell through the three phases of the 
programme. Overall, on average, Gateway leavers spent 5.5 months on ND25 
plus. However, this was over six months under the original national 
programme, a little under six months under the enhanced programme and just 
over three months under the re-engineered national programme.  
 
3.25. The average time spent on ND25 plus for Gateway leavers has been cut 
in half over the course of the programme. This indicates that the pace of the 
programme did increase following programme enhancement and increased 
further when the programme was re-engineered.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Average time on ND25 plus for Gateway Leavers by 
programme phase 
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Destination of AIP/Gateway Leavers 
 
3.26. To assess the success of the changes to the AIP/Gateway, what 
happens to clients when they leave this stage of the programme is 
considered. Table 3.1 shows the exit destinations of AIP/Gateway leavers. In 
the first row, the number of AIP/Gateway entrants up to December 2001 is 
reported. Restricting the sample in this way gives the vast majority of these 
entrants the opportunity to have fully participated in the AIP/Gateway. This is 
reflected in the figures in the second row, which indicate that 98 per cent of 
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Gateway entrants have left the Gateway by June 2002, including 94.5 per 
cent of the 89,000 Gateway entrants on the re-engineered programme.  
 
3.27. The remainder of the table reports the percentage of AIP/Gateway 
leavers going to various exit destinations. Here we consider clients who have 
participated in AIP/Gateway opportunities such as subsidised employment, 
ETO and other ES opportunities under the original and enhanced national 
programmes as having left the AIP/Gateway. Whilst this is not strictly how the 
programme operated, it allows for a comparison of leavers to these 
opportunities with leavers to the newly introduced IAP under the re-
engineered programme.  
 
3.28. The biggest change in exit destinations was in the percentage that left 
the AIP/Gateway to return to claim JSA. From the original and enhanced 
national programme roughly a half of AIP/Gateway leavers returned to JSA 
whilst from the re-engineered national programme the figure was just 14 per 
cent. This reflects the mandatory nature of the IAP under the re-engineered 
programme for participants aged 25-49. The 14 per cent of Gateway leavers 
that returned to JSA under the re-engineered national programme are 
predominantly participants aged 50 and over for whom the IAP is not 
compulsory. 
 
 
Table 3.1 AIP/Gateway Entrants and Leavers Exit Destinations 
 All Original Enhanced Re-
engineered1
Number of 
AIP/Gateway 
Entrants (‘000s)2 
428.4 242.2 97.5 88.8 
Percentage Leavers 98.0 99.2 98.0 94.5 
Percentage leaving 
to: 
    
IAP or AIP/Gateway 
opportunities3  
20 16 14 38 
Unsubsidised 
Employment 
13 12 14 18 
Transfer to Other 
Benefits 
11 9 12 14 
Other 5 5 5 7 
Unknown  7 7 7 8 
Return to JSA 43 51 48 14 
1. Under the Re-engineered programme, entry to the IAP following the Gateway is mandatory for 
participants aged 25-49. 
2. These figures only include entrants to ND25 plus up to the end of December 2001. 
3. This includes AIP/Gateway opportunities (subsidised employment, ETO and other ES activities) under 
the original and enhanced programmes. Clients who participated in these opportunities are classed here 
as having left the AIP/Gateway.  
 
3.29. Because of this large change, the percentage of Gateway leavers to 
other destinations increased for all categories under the re-engineered 
relative to the original and enhanced national programmes. The largest 
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increase was entrants to the IAP, or those continuing on ND25 plus, from 16 
per cent of AIP/Gateway leavers under the original national programme to 38 
per cent of Gateway leavers under the re-engineered programme. A much 
larger percentage of ND25 plus clients are actively involved in a significant 
piece of provision under the re-engineered programme than under the original 
and enhanced national programmes. 
 
3.30. The introduction of a mandatory IAP also increased moves into 
unsubsidised employment and slightly increased the transfer to other benefits. 
Some of these changes may be due to the improved Gateway experience, but 
it is not possible to disentangle this from strategies to avoid IAP participation. 
 
 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities and the Intensive Activity Period 
 
3.31. The Intensive Activity Period (IAP) was only introduced in April 2001 
reflecting pilot and NDYP provision, but broadly similar provision was 
available under the AIP/Gateway stage of the earlier versions of the 
programme. 
 
3.32. Under the original national programme, clients could access a period of 
subsidised employment, Education and Training Opportunities (ETO) or other 
ES provision. The available provision was expanded under the enhanced 
national programme to include other externally contracted provision, for 
example soft skills courses or key skills courses. Provision was voluntary 
under both the original and enhanced stages of the programme. 
 
3.33. When the programme was re-engineered, this type of provision was 
radically overhauled creating a package of individually tailored provision. This 
provision covered a range of opportunities underpinned by intensive job 
search to help people move into work as quickly as possible. It became 
mandatory for all participants under age 50, when previously it was only 
mandatory in the pilots. Opportunities available include work experience, work 
placements, work-focused training, BET, self employment support, help with 
motivation and soft skills.  ETO remained available for a small number of 
participants. A similar range of provision was available where the pilots 
operated. 
 
 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities and Pilot IAP 
 
3.34. Entry to AIP or Gateway opportunities was fairly limited given that such 
participation was voluntary. In general, motivated clients would participate and 
as such it may be expected that in general they would also be motivated to 
find work at the end of the experience.  
 
3.35. In the pilots, Legard et al (2000) and Molloy and Ritchie (2000) found 
that participants were positive about joining an IAP where they felt they had a 
degree of choice over what activity they did and when it was relevant to their 
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needs. The opportunity to take a half-day taster, before choosing an activity, 
was also welcomed. Dissatisfaction arose when participants felt they were 
“time-filling” or repeating courses done previously on other programmes.  
 
3.36. The mandatory nature of the IAP was often criticised, but it was also 
conceded that it could be beneficial in terms of broadening horizons and re-
establishing a work routine. Atkinson et al (2000) also found a significant drop 
out at the beginning of the IAP in the pilots, seen by NDPAs to be a filter for 
those clients who do not want work or who are unavailable for work.  
 
3.37. Work experience placements with employers were a successful feature 
of the IAP in the pilots. A significant number of placements led to permanent 
jobs, with successful placements more likely where clients needs, abilities and 
interests were taken into account. However, there was concern that clients 
taking up work placements in the environmental and voluntary sector often 
have significant barriers to work and need longer than 13 weeks on the IAP to 
overcome them (Atkinson et al, 2000).   
 
3.38. Under the original national programme, the employment subsidy was 
generally well received because it was felt it could bring participants closer to 
the labour market (Legard et al, 2000). However, ETO were often felt not to 
be meeting client needs and were often aimed at a level below them and did 
not lead to the desired qualification (Legard et al, 2000 and Atkinson et al, 
2000).  
 
3.39. Under the enhanced programme, the availability and hence use of 
external services was varied (Winterbotham et al, 2001). In addition, some 
Advisers were sceptical about the quality of available provision in line with 
concerns about ETO discussed above. Some felt it had been “borrowed” and 
pieced together from other programmes and was hence somewhat “tired”. 
The most common provision, however, were short courses aimed at 
improving job search covering CVs and writing job applications, interview 
technique and job search methods. These were generally well received.  
 
3.40. The Jobseeker’s Grant was also well received by those who got it and it 
does seem to have made a difference in their getting work or aiding their 
transition to work. However, it was used infrequently and only for more job 
ready clients. 
 
 
The Mandatory Intensive Activity Period in the Re-engineered 
Programme 
 
3.41. NDPAs consider the mandatory IAP one of the key improvements 
introduced in April 2001. One of the key effects has been that the threat of 
having to undertake an activity has led to an increase in people signing off the 
unemployment register (Winterbotham et al, 2002).  
 
3.42. The IAP is intended to provide activities for clients who have not found a 
job during the Gateway. It is mandatory for clients aged 25-49 and voluntary 
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for clients aged 50 or over.  There were clearly teething problems setting up 
the new provision, but it seems that these have generally been resolved 
(Wilson, 2002 and Winterbotham et al, 2002).  
 
3.43. There are three of models of IAP delivery: modular, routeway or both. 
The modular approach allows Advisers to select suitable modules from an 
available range and co-ordinate them into a coherent package of provision. 
Under the routeway or combination approach the Adviser agrees the direction 
of the IAP and the lead provider arranges the details of the provision. 
Therefore there is some variation in the influence of the training provider in 
terms of the provision received.  
 
3.44. The role of the NDPAs has clearly expanded under the re-engineered 
programme and the relationship between NDPAs and providers has also 
become increasingly important. Under the modular approach the selected 
provision is dependent on Adviser knowledge of the available provision and 
under the routeway approach there remains considerable interaction between 
NDPAs and providers throughout the IAP. 
 
3.45. In line with evidence from the earlier phases of ND25 plus, NDPAs felt 
that a 13 week IAP was sufficient for motivated clients, but probably 
insufficient for clients who were not work ready or who had negative attitudes 
to the programme and to work. For clients with basic skills needs, BET was an 
important element of the provision. This could last for up to 26 weeks, 
although many NDPAs felt that even this length of provision may be 
insufficient for clients with severe basic skills needs. 
 
3.46. For clients with adequate basic skills, there was an increasing tendency 
for clients to be referred to work experience placements rather than training 
(Hasluck, 2002). This was because NDPAs felt work experience was what 
most clients needed to secure a job. Also as pointed out above, in the pilots 
work experience placements were found to be relatively successful in leading 
to a permanent job. 
 
3.47. For other provision there were concerns that the IAP was aimed at too 
elementary a level and that the needs of more experienced or skilled clients 
were not being addressed. In addition, NDPAs were concerned that clients 
undertook too little job search activity during the IAP. 
 
 
The impact of AIP/Gateway Opportunities and the IAP 
 
3.48. In line with the analysis for Gateway leavers, Table 3.2 considers those 
ND25 plus clients who enter AIP/Gateway Opportunities or the IAP up to the 
end of September 2001 and looks at their destination on leaving. In this 
section when we consider the IAP we are also referring to the AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities available under the original and enhanced national programmes 
discussed above.  
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3.49. There were 84.9 thousand entrants to AIP/Gateway Opportunities and 
IAP up to September 2001. Because of the mandatory nature of the IAP after 
April 2001 there was a much higher percentage of IAP entrants under the re-
engineered programme than the earlier programmes. By the end of June 
2002, 91 per cent of all AIP/Gateway opportunities and IAP entrants had left 
ND25 plus, with 81 per cent of IAP entrants under the re-engineered 
programme having left the IAP.  
 
 
Table 3.2 AIP/Gateway Opportunities and IAP Entrants and Leavers Exit 
Destinations 
 All Original Enhanced Re-
Engineered1
Number of Entrants 
(‘000s) 
84.9 38.9 13.8 32.2 
Percentage Leavers 90.8 97.0 95.4 81.4 
Percentage leaving 
to: 
    
Follow-through 55 52 51 62 
Unsubsidised 
Employment 
6 5 5 9 
Transfer to Other 
Benefits 
2 2 1 2 
Other  4 5 3 1 
Unknown  21 21 24 19 
Return to JSA 12 16 15 6 
1. In the re-engineered programme, entry to the Follow Through was mandatory for all IAP leavers 
remaining on the programme.  
2. These figures only include entrants to ND25 plus up to the end of September 2001. 
 
3.50. Just over a half of AIP/Gateway Opportunities leavers went onto the 
Follow-through stage under the original and enhanced national programmes, 
compared with 62 per cent of IAP leavers under the re-engineered 
programme. This may be a reflection of the view that clients spend little time 
involved in job search during the IAP, so that they have gained some relevant 
experience from the IAP, but not been able to quickly transfer this experience 
into a job outcome. 
 
3.51. The increased exits to Follow-through under the re-engineered 
programme are offset by reduced exits to return to JSA. Under the original 
and enhanced national programmes, one in six AIP/Gateway opportunities 
leavers went back into JSA compared to just six per cent under the re-
engineered programme. These differences were most likely driven by the 
mandatory nature of Follow-through under the re-engineered programme 
compared with voluntary Follow-through for the earlier versions of the 
programme.  
 
3.52. The percentage of leavers to unsubsidised employment, however, was 
fairly low, at five per cent under the original and enhanced national 
programmes and nine per cent under the re-engineered programme. This 
may again reflect the lack of job search activity that takes place during this 
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stage of the programme, whilst the increase under the re-engineered 
programme may be a reflection of the individually tailored provision or the 
increased use of work placements, making a more direct link between 
employers and ND25 plus participants.  
 
3.53. There is however, a very large group (21 per cent) of leavers for which 
we do not know their exit destination. Without knowledge of these destinations 
it is hard to put the increased exits to unsubsidised employment into a proper 
perspective.  
 
 
The different elements of AIP/Gateway Opportunities and the 
IAP  
 
3.54. We have already discussed the different elements of AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities and the IAP in some detail. Table 3.3 gives the number of 
entrants to these different opportunities.  
 
3.55. Under the original national programme roughly a half of all participants 
in AIP opportunities took part in WBLA. The other main opportunities entered 
were subsidised employment and full-time education and training. In the 
enhanced national programme WBLA remained a significant element of 
provision, although the proportion participating in it fell to two-fifths. Significant 
numbers of participants continued to go into subsidised employment, whilst 
fewer participants entered full-time education and training. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Number of AIP/Gateway Opportunity and IAP Entrants by type 
of activity 
 
(thousands) 
All Original  Enhanced  Re-
Engineered 
IAP Entrants 84.9 38.9 13.8 32.2 
     
Subsidised 
Employment 
20.6 11.9 4.5 4.2 
Work experience 
placement 
10.0 0.2 0.5 9.3 
Full-time Education 
and Training 
9.0 6.8 1.2 1.0 
IAP Training 12.1 0.3 1.2 10.6 
WBLA  25.1 19.5 5.5 - 
BET / Basic Skills 5.6 0.2 0.5 5.0 
Other 2.5 - 0.3 2.2 
1. These figures only include entrants to ND25 plus up to the end of September 2001. 
 
3.56. With the re-engineered programme, WBLA was taken off the menu as 
provision became more individually tailored. WBLA was already available to 
JSA claimants after six months unemployment so that interested participants 
could already have participated in WBLA. Thus it was felt including it in ND25 
plus provision added little for most participants. Instead, most participants with 
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a training need took part either in IAP training or where required a BET or 
basic skills course.  
 
3.57. Roughly a third of entrants went into employment related opportunities 
in each phase of the programme. Under the original and enhanced 
programmes this meant subsidised employment, but with the introduction of 
the re-engineered programme this increasingly meant a work experience 
placement.  
 
3.58. Table 3.4 gives the exit destinations of AIP/Gateway opportunities and 
IAP leavers for each of the distinct types of provision highlighted above. For 
most activities, the Follow-through is the predominant destination. The only 
exception to this is that less than one in three leavers from subsidised 
employment enter the follow through.  
 
3.59. Roughly a half of leavers from subsidised employment had an unknown 
destination reported, which may suggest that a significant number of them 
have actually remained in employment because they have not immediately re-
appeared in the ND25 plus administrative system. 
 
3.60. Relative few leavers reported a move into unsubsidised employment, 
typically just below ten per cent of all leavers. There is little difference in the 
percentage going into unsubsidised employment across the different types of 
provision. However, it is noticeable that the lowest percentage of IAP leavers 
to unsubsidised employment comes from the type of provision that NDPAs felt 
did not meet client needs. Just three per cent of WBLA participants left to 
unsubsidised employment. 
 
 
Table 3.4 AIP/Gateway Opportunity and IAP Leavers Exit Destinations by 
type of activity 
 Follow 
Through 
Unsubsidised 
Employment 
Transfer 
to Other 
Benefits 
Other Unknown Return 
to JSA 
AIP/Gateway or IAP Opportunity     
Subsidised 
Employment 
28 5 + + 51 15 
Work 
Experience 
Placement 
68 10 3 1 14 4 
Full-time 
Education 
and Training 
41 9 8 7 9 26 
IAP Training 69 9 2 2 15 3 
WBLA 71 3 + 7 4 15 
BET/Basic 
Skills 
66 9 3 2 18 3 
Other 48 15 1 2 27 7 
+ indicates a positive percentage, but less than 0.5 per cent. 
1. These figures only include entrants to ND25 plus up to the end of September 2001. 
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The Follow-through 
 
3.61. The Follow-through has been available throughout ND25 plus in a 
broadly consistent format. Under the original and enhanced national 
programmes it was available in the form of additional interviews with NDPAs 
for clients who left ND25 plus and returned within 13 weeks, or clients who 
completed or left subsidised employment, ETO or other provision.  
 
3.62. Follow-Through entrants had a wide variety of needs depending on what 
had been achieved earlier on the programme (Molloy and Ritchie, 2000 about 
the original national programme). Some required specific forms of help to fill 
earlier gaps in provision, whilst for others original needs remained. Under the 
original national programme Follow-through consisted of a return to see an 
Adviser on a weekly basis with very little in the way of additional activities. For 
participants who felt they had benefited from opportunities available under the 
AIP they often felt that the transition to Follow-through was abrupt and the 
positive effects of the provision in terms of increased motivation and optimism 
about finding work could be undone.  
 
3.63. The capacity of the Follow-through in the pilots was also felt to be 
insufficient (Atkinson et al, 2000). Many Follow-through entrants in the pilots 
were difficult to help and motivate. For those wanting to work they often had 
severe barriers to employment, which the programme had not been able to 
fully address. Other Follow-through entrants did not want to participate in 
employment or the programme as a whole and required specialist 
motivational training.  
 
 
Table 3.5 Follow-through Entrants and Leavers Exit Destinations 
 All Original 
Provision 
Enhanced 
Provision 
Re-
Engineered 
Provision 
Number of Follow-
through Entrants 
(‘000s) 
42.6 19.6 6.8 16.3 
Percentage Leavers 81.8 96.0 87.2 62.4 
Percentage leaving 
to: 
    
Unsubsidised 
Employment 
15 15 15 15 
Transfer to Other 
Benefits 
6 6 6 8 
Other 6 7 5 5 
Unknown  8 7 9 10 
Return to JSA 65 66 65 63 
These figures only include entrants to ND25 plus up to the end of December 2001. 
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3.64. Under the re-engineered programme, Follow-through was also seen to 
be an important stage of the programme by NDPAs. However, Winterbotham 
et al (2002), report few signs that job outcomes occur during the Follow-
through stage  
 
3.65. These generally negative impressions are reflected in Table 3.5. First 
we note the small numbers of participants that have reached the Follow-
through stage, just 43,000 of entrants up to December 2001. Also of note is 
that from these entrants, from the re-engineered programme, just 62.4 per 
cent of them have left ND25 plus by June 2002, so it is possible that these 
leavers are not wholly representative of Follow-through entrants under this 
phase of the programme. 
 
3.66. What is clear in Table 3.5 is that the pattern of exit destinations is similar 
across the three ND25 plus phases, so that despite reducing the time spent 
and improving the intensity of job search on Follow-through, there is no 
evidence of increased job placements. Roughly two-thirds of Follow-through 
leavers returned to claim JSA, whilst just 15 per cent went into unsubsidised 
employment, six per cent transferred to other benefits, six per cent left to 
other destinations and eight per cent to unknown destinations. 
 
 
Benefit Sanctions 
 
3.67. Another key element of ND25 plus was benefit sanctions. Under the 
original and enhanced national programmes, Sanctions only applied to the 
mandatory parts of the programme and participants in the voluntary ETO. 
Here, participants went two weeks without JSA if they failed to start the Option 
or they left without good cause. Further breaches of rules led to four week 
Sanctions.  
 
3.68. With the introduction of the re-engineered programme and mandatory 
post Gateway participation, the same Sanctions operated for first and second 
breaches of rules, whilst a third and subsequent breaches of rules led to a 26 
week Sanction. Hardship payments are available for people felt to be in 
vulnerable groups and in some cases to people facing their first or second 
sanction even if they are not in a vulnerable group.  
 
3.69. Only 2.6 per cent of ND25 plus participants had ever been sanctioned, 
with the vast majority of these receiving only a two week sanction. Less than 
0.1 per cent of all ND25 plus participants have been sanctioned on more than 
two occasions. In the period when 26 week sanctions were in operation, 
roughly 200 participants had been sanctioned on two or more occasions.  
 
3.70. Saunders, Stone and Candy (2001) conducted a series of interviews 
with sanctioned jobseekers from NDYP and ND25 plus. 26 week sanctions 
were the primary focus of their research, which was conducted before 26 
week sanctioning was introduced for ND25 plus. However, their research did 
cover 12 ND25 plus participants who had been sanctioned for four weeks. 
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3.71. The impact of sanctioning was explored, with a view to the likely impact 
of 26 week sanctioning for ND25 plus participants. The interviews covered 
sanctioned jobseekers, NDPAs and Option providers. Whilst most conclusions 
apply to both NDYP and ND25 plus, the additional focus on NDYP makes 
some of the findings much more geared toward the operation of this 
programme.  
 
3.72. 26 week sanctions tended to occur for three reasons. First, when 
jobseekers did not want to be on New Deal. Second, when they felt they did 
not have a choice regarding their New Deal activity Option (clearly this did not 
apply to ND25 plus participants interviewed because activities at this time 
were voluntary, but is likely to be relevant under the existing provision). Third, 
when jobseekers misunderstood what was required of them.  
 
3.73. Molloy and Ritchie (2000) found that sanctions had both financial and 
psychological impacts. For many, the reaction to sanctions often involved 
looking for work, with some finding short term or casual work. Other 
sanctioned people often had genuine barriers to employment, and NDPAs 
and Option providers expressed concerns over the vulnerability of this group. 
In these circumstances NDPAs felt that some such jobseekers need an 
extended Gateway before starting Options and this may lessen the need for 
sanctions.  
 
3.74. There was widespread support for the principle of sanctioning even 
among sanctioned jobseekers, though they were likely to consider 26 weeks 
as “too harsh”. NDPAs were more likely to see 26-week sanctions as a useful 
tool that clients took seriously. 
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4. New Deal Personal Advisers 
 
4.1. In this section we consider the key role played by NDPAs throughout the 
programme. The evidence presented comes from interviews with NDPAs and 
participants. The evidence shows how the experience of NDPAs led to 
positive programme changes and how the role of NDPAs changed within the 
Gateway and Follow-through stages. The evidence comes from a comparison 
of pilot and national areas and comparison of provision to ND25 plus and 
NDYP clients as well as more recent interviews with NDPAs operating the re-
engineered provision.  
 
4.2. In general it was the comparisons with the pilots and NDYP that have led 
to the programme changes and ultimately national provision has become 
more in line with NDYP and pilot provision. 
 
4.3. It has been shown that both the AIP/Gateway and the Follow-through are 
key elements of the programme across all the phases of provision, although 
the nature of the AIP/Gateway and Follow-through have changed over time. In 
all phases of the provision the AIP/Gateway has been mandatory, whilst 
under the original and enhanced programme the Follow-through was 
voluntary and only became mandatory once the programme was re-
engineered in April 2001. 
 
4.4. Early evidence from the start of the programme highlighted differences in 
provision between national and pilot areas and also with comparison to 
NDYP. These were primarily related to the quality of the AIP and the voluntary 
nature of participation at the end of the AIP. 
 
4.5. The Tavistock Institute (1999) reported that NDPAs found the original 
national programme unsatisfactory in terms of meeting the needs of the 25 
plus age group compared with the range of support and provision available 
within the pilots and under NDYP. In addition where NDPAs dealt both with 
NDYP and ND25 plus clients then the NDYP group took priority. 
 
4.6. Legard et al (2000) also reported that pilot participants generally 
experienced a higher degree of satisfaction with their interviews with NDPAs 
than participants in national areas. In national areas disappointment was 
attributed to time pressures on NDPAs and the inability of the AIP to meet the 
high level of demand for other Gateway activities. 
 
4.7. Training available to NDPAs was seen as disappointing, centring on 
caseload management. NDPAs felt that a greater ability to assess skills, to 
transfer skills and the ability to sell the programme to clients would have been 
more valuable (Tavistock, 1999).  
 
4.8. Participants felt that the comprehensiveness of needs assessments 
carried out by NDPAs was variable (Molloy and Ritchie, 2000). When they felt 
needs were understood they were more optimistic and positive about the 
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programme. However, in some cases, needs could remain hidden because 
participants were unsure about what was appropriate to disclose to the NDPA.  
 
4.9. Evidence from the pilots at this time indicated that the initial stage of 
interaction with clients was vital, so that clients can understand the 
opportunities available to them and so that they are aware of their 
responsibilities (Atkinson et al, 2000). Client confusion was evident when 
there were a number of organisations delivering the pilot.  
 
4.10. A number of pilots set up provision for small payments to clients to help 
with job entry (Atkinson et al, 2000). This was widely found to be excellent 
value for money provided NDPAs were given reasonable discretion over 
eligibility and use.   
 
4.11. In the enhanced national programme, the Gateway became more 
structured with additional and more regular interviews with NDPAs. This was 
in response to the criticisms outlined above where the AIP was felt to be 
insufficient.  
 
4.12. Improvements were made in the assessment of basic skills problems 
and barriers to employment, which were identified by NDPAs as being 
unsatisfactory and by participants as being variable. Specialist careers 
guidance and mentoring also became available and other specialist services 
were made available to address the lack of key skills and soft skills among 
clients. In addition a Jobseekers Grant was made available that had been 
found to be useful in pilot areas. 
 
4.13. NDPAs felt that while some of the enhancements had been beneficial, 
the overall effect of the enhanced programme was marginal (Winterbotham et 
al, 2001). Part of the problem was that caseloads had fallen leaving a 
hardcore of clients with poor motivation, very long spells of unemployment 
and severe barriers to finding work. 
 
4.14. The enhanced provision allowed NDPAs to help motivated participants, 
but the package of provision was insufficient to help the remainder of the 
caseload. NDPAs often reported that the programme needs to be more like 
NDYP and more of the provision needs to be mandatory. A wider range of 
opportunities was also felt to be desirable covering the NDYP Options, the 
Environmental Task Force and Voluntary Sector opportunities.  
 
4.15. More regular advisory interviews were viewed positively by Advisers, as 
was the addition of the Jobseeker’s Grant. The interviews allowed more 
chance to develop a good relationship with participants, whilst the grant was 
felt to be a useful tool to assist the more motivated, job-ready clients who 
faced last minute minor hurdles when trying to get a job. 
 
4.16. In April 2001 the whole programme was restructured. The programme 
built on the effective elements of NDYP and pilot provision and allowed for 
greater flexibility, closer working with NDPAs to develop a package of 
provision tailored to individual needs and to provide help when applying for 
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jobs. In July 2001 new assistance was introduced to ND25 plus in the form of 
an Adviser Discretion Fund (ADF). This was made available to assist job 
ready clients in the transition to work. 
 
4.17. The greater flexibility was welcomed in areas where the national 
provision had been operating, but in pilot areas the re-engineered programme 
was perceived to be less flexible than pilot provision (Wilson, 2001). It was felt 
that there was a much wider range of provision available and the programme 
had become more client-led and the provision was tailor-made for individual 
needs (Winterbotham et al, 2002).  
 
4.18. Wilson (2001) found agreement that the Gateway was effective for 
clients that are work ready. However, there were mixed views on the value of 
the Gateway for “harder to help” client groups. For these clients the Gateway 
was mainly used for IAP planning.  
 
4.19. Training of NDPAs was again felt to be inadequate in the first six months 
of the programme leading to teething problems for the first six months of the 
re-engineered programme (Wilson, 2001 and Winterbotham et al, 2002).  
Later in the programme Joyce and Pettigrew (2002) reported that, overall, 
NDPAs were happy with the content of their training, although some felt it was 
sometimes delivered at the wrong times.  
 
4.20. The paperwork involved was also criticised (Joyce and Pettigrew, 2002) 
as being excessive and impinging on advisers’ ability to carry out their role 
effectively. 
 
4.21. All NDPAs were expected to meet a range of targets, including referrals 
to providers and job submissions. The latter were unpopular because they 
were felt to encourage unsuitable referrals to employers (Joyce and Pettigrew, 
2002). 
 
4.22. The ADF was unanimously viewed as a flexible tool to assist positive 
outcomes (Wilson, 2002). In areas where pilots had not previously operated, 
Advisers took time to develop effective use of the ADF, with initially a very 
conservative approach. Once this was overcome the ADF was felt to help 
client Adviser relations. The ADF was also felt to empower NDPAs, giving 
them more scope to help needy clients (Winterbotham et al, 2002).  
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5.  Employers and Training Providers 
 
5.1. Other key agents in ND25 plus are employers and training providers. For 
employers in terms of taking long-term unemployed people into subsidised 
and unsubsidised jobs as well as into work experience placements. Whilst 
training providers deliver many other elements of the programme.  
 
 
Employers 
 
5.2. Hales et al (2000) present findings from a survey of employers who had 
recruited individuals from either NDYP or ND25 plus with interviews taking 
place between September 1999 and January 2000. 77 per cent of employers 
had fewer than 25 employees, and 78 per cent were single-site organisations 
with most being in the private sector, but one in six was in the voluntary or 
public sector.  
 
 
The employment subsidy 
 
5.3. Employers had a range of reasons for recruiting using the employment 
subsidy, with many motivated by the reduction in costs, whilst one in five 
wished to help unemployed people (Hales et al, 2000). Employers were more 
encouraged to participate where the labour market was tight or they were 
unable to recruit from normal sources. 
 
5.4. Recruitment was typically through a NDPA, with the vacancy having been 
designated for a New Deal participant. For smaller employers the subsidy was 
vital (Winterbotham et al, 2002), but was less important for larger employers. 
This is important because as noted above, most New Deal employers are 
small. 
 
5.5. In the pilots, employers claimed not to have been primarily motivated to 
take part by the availability of a subsidy (Atkinson et al, 2000). In general they 
felt the size of the subsidy was about right in terms of covering additional 
costs and making long-term unemployed recruits economically viable.  
 
5.6. Most employers had not been offered any choice in either the level or 
phasing of payment. However, when asked their preferences, they were in 
favour of an upfront payment to cover the period when they incurred most 
costs. A simple easily administered payment was also preferred over complex 
staged payments.  
 
5.7. NDPAs are aware of the key role of the subsidy for many employers, 
particularly small and medium sized employers, but,  in general, they felt it 
had not been well marketed and this was a clear area for improvement in the 
programme (Winterbotham et al, 2002).  
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Employer awareness of New Deal 
 
5.8. Awareness of ND25 plus was patchy among employers (Atkinson et al, 
2000). In the pilots employers recognised the general parameters of the 
programme and were aware of some key elements, particularly the subsidy, 
but understood little else.  
 
5.9. Under the enhanced national programme, Winterbotham et al (2001) 
reported that some employers had not known where they had recruited from, 
some knew it was a New Deal participant and others knew it was from the 
Jobcentre. This supports the view from the pilots that employers were 
confused by the proliferation of New Deal variants, but did generally recognise 
the New Deal brand. New Deal was felt to be associated with a higher quality 
more serious approach than previous schemes (Atkinson et al, 2000).  
 
 
Employer attitudes to ND25 plus clients 
 
5.10. ES staff saw the ND25 plus client group having attributes that make 
them more attractive in employment terms than NDYP clients (Tavistock, 
1999) and this is also the view of employers (Atkinson et al, 2000). ND25 plus 
clients often having driving licenses, some work experience, transferable 
skills, less chaotic lifestyles and are also perceived as being reliable, 
trustworthy and have a greater likelihood of sticking in the job.  
 
5.11. Most employers in the original national programme felt the recruit met 
their job specification and said they would have selected the same recruit in 
the absence of the subsidy (Hales et al, 2000). The majority of recruits (62 per 
cent including NDYP recruits) were still employed at the end of the 
employment subsidy. After nine months this fell to 51 per cent, but was higher 
at 60 per cent for ND25 plus recruits. Most employers felt that New Deal had 
no impact on their output, but two-fifths became more positive about recruiting 
unemployed people.  
 
5.12. Under the enhanced national programme, Winterbotham et al (2001) 
also reporteded that there was a generally positive view of ND25 plus 
participants amongst employers. Where there were problems these were 
related to lack of motivation, alcohol problems and stealing. Atkinson et al, 
(2000) also report that in the pilots employers did not distinguish strongly 
between 12, 18 and 24 months unemployment, but for longer durations there 
were additional concerns about the reason for the long duration and the ease 
of re-integration to work. In general, employers were also strongly averse to 
some other personal attributes including: a criminal record; evidence of 
substance abuse; language problems; and mental health problems 
particularly if associated with behavioural and/or attendance concerns. 
 
5.13. Problems had occurred due to delays in seeing candidates, or obviously 
unsuitable candidates, which led some employers to a feeling of 
disenchantment. This was also highlighted as a problem by NDPAs. Most 
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employers, however, were positive about the NDPAs. Employers from the re-
engineered programme were generally happy with the programme, although 
desired more NDPA contact throughout the programme (Wilson, 2002).  
 
 
Training Providers 
 
5.14. Atkinson et al (2000) found a marked feature of all pilots was the 
extensive use of specialist providers during the Gateway and IAP. This had 
greatly extended the volume, range and expertise of support. In addition, 
under the enhanced national programme there was a wider range of services 
available under the Gateway than had been available in the AIP under the 
original national programme and this has been extended further with the re-
engineered programme. Because of this much of the evidence regarding 
training providers is from the re-engineered programme where providers now 
have a more significant role to play (Winterbotham et al, 2002; Wilson, 2002).  
 
 
The introduction of the re-engineered provision 
 
5.15. With the introduction of the re-engineered programme providers became 
a more important element of ND25 plus particularly under the routeway model 
of delivery discussed above. Early on in this phase of the programme 
Advisers were often unclear about the available provision, hence in some 
areas they relied heavily on routeway providers. In one of the areas 
considered, a formalised 3-way interview between the client, the NDPA and 
the provider was introduced to discuss the participants IAP in detail. However, 
once Adviser knowledge had improved, such 3-way interviews were used less 
frequently. 
 
5.16. Providers shared the view of Advisers that the start of the re-engineered 
programme was chaotic, but after a few months the programme had settled 
down and was operating as intended. The feeling was that it had been 
brought in quickly and ES staff were still developing and understanding the 
programme. 
 
 
Relationships with NDPAs 
 
5.17. In most areas there had been tensions between providers and Advisers 
in deciding on the IAP for clients. Some of these tensions arose because 
Providers felt Advisers saw the programme as a training programme, whereas 
they regarded it as a job outcome programme.  
 
5.18. Relationships with ES staff had developed to a point where they were 
beginning to work effectively together. In some areas provider staff were 
present in Jobcentres.   
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5.19. After some time Advisers were paying more attention to the quality of 
provision on offer. In terms of training providers these concerns covered the 
lack of tailored provision, the quality and amount of job search being carried 
out, and the level of outcomes being achieved. Similar concerns were aired 
about work placements. 
 
 
Referrals and profile flexibility 
 
5.20. Providers became concerned by lower than expected numbers of 
referrals during the early months of the re-engineered programme. By 
March/April 2002 most providers were under profile for the year, however, 
referrals had increased to expected levels by the end of 2002.  
 
5.21. They also felt they were receiving little feedback from the ES, 
particularly about the reconciliation process and the flexibility allowed to them 
if numbers exceeded target for an area of provision, but were below target in 
another area. These problems were also much reduced by April 2002 after 
decisions were made about changing profiles.  
 
 
Participants and Employers 
 
5.22. Providers were surprised by the high proportion of participants with 
multiple employment barriers. This had contributed to lower than hoped for job 
outcomes. In some cases providers occasionally returned clients who were 
“inappropriate”.  
 
5.23. Links with employers were nearly always discussed in terms of having 
employers willing to take placements. Most providers felt they had good links 
with local employers. This has been boosted by recent employment of staff 
with these responsibilities.  
 
5.24. In most cases there was no discussion with employers about the design 
of courses or provision. In one area, however, courses were set up 
specifically in the way required by two large local employers. There were also 
other examples of employers undertaking mock interviews with clients and 
providing feedback or providing advice on recruitment criteria for job 
preparation courses. 
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6.  The Impact of ND25 plus 
 
6.1. So far we have concentrated primarily on a description of the evolution of 
the programme and perceptions from key agents about the programme. In 
this section we bring together the existing evidence from quantitative 
evaluations of ND25 plus to assess the overall impact of ND25 plus on 
participants. 
 
6.2. The quantitative research assesses the impact of ND25 plus on a range 
of outcome measures including the exit destinations discussed in Section 
Two, against an assessment of what would have happened to ND25 plus 
participants if ND25 plus had not been introduced.  
 
6.3. A range of methodological approaches were adopted dependent on the 
group of participants to be considered. Essentially, there were three different 
analyses. The first, Wilkinson (2001), looks at the experience of JSA 
claimants who have the criteria that would make them eligible for ND25 plus, 
both before and after its introduction relative to a comparison group of JSA 
claimants who would not be eligible for ND25 plus. This was conducted as 
part of a “macroeconomic” assessment covering both ND25 plus and NDYP.  
 
6.4. The other two (Lissenburgh 2001b, and Wilkinson 2002b) assessed 
outcome measures both from administrative and survey data for pilot 
participants against a comparison group of non-participants, many of whom 
would go on to participate in ND25 plus at a later date. The latter work was 
accompanied by a series of analyses of administrative data for a larger group 
of participants (see for example Wilkinson 2002a, for the final report in this 
series).  
 
6.5. The quantitative evaluations require a significant amount of time to follow 
individuals once they have participated in ND25 plus, hence to date there is 
no evidence of this nature for participants in the re-engineered programme. In 
fact, much of the evidence is concerned with the original national programme 
and pilot provision, with only one study covering the period of the enhanced 
national programme.    
 
 
The macroeconomic assessment 
 
6.6. The macroeconomic assessment only covered entrants to ND25 plus up 
to May 1999, as such, it is only concerned with the original national 
programme. It is based on administrative data about JSA claimants from the 
Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) five per cent 
cohort. The approach adopted was a before and after comparison for a group 
of individuals that have the eligibility criteria to qualify for ND25 plus and a 
group that do not. The approach is limited by the lack of a good comparison 
group. The only available comparison group was short-term unemployed 
entrants. This group of jobseekers may be very different to ND25 plus 
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entrants and may also respond differently to other labour market changes as 
ND25 plus was introduced. Because of this, the results of this analysis need 
be treated cautiously.  
 
6.7. The key finding was that for men, ND25 plus participants were four 
percentage points less likely to be unemployed 12 months after entering 
ND25 plus than if ND25 plus had not been introduced. For women, the impact 
of ND25 plus was negligible. The impact on ND25 plus participants leaving 
unemployment to go into work was smaller and generally not significant.  
 
6.8. Given these findings the figures about exit destinations discussed above 
can be put in context. Under the original national programme, 14 per cent of 
programme entrants left to unsubsidised employment, and the evidence here 
suggests that nearly all of these would have left to work even if ND25 plus 
had not been introduced. For the later stages of provision we would need to 
see much higher exit rates to unsubsidised employment to argue that the 
programme had a substantial impact on employment. Under the re-
engineered programme 28 per cent of leavers went into unsubsidised 
employment so it may be possible to argue that the programme has had a 
positive impact on employment. However, we have seen that the client group 
and the labour market have changed over time, so for a robust assessment of 
the impact of the programme an assessment is needed of the net impact 
against what would have happened to participants if the re-engineered 
programme had not been introduced.  
 
 
Quantitative Evaluations for Pilot Participants 
 
6.9. In the majority of pilot areas, all eligible long-term unemployed people are 
given the pilot provision. However, it was decided that two of the pilots should 
be designed in such a way that they could be evaluated using a random 
assignment methodology. In these two areas, half of the eligible client group 
is assigned at random to receive the pilot provision. The remainder receives 
the kinds of services normally offered by the then ES to people with the same 
length of unemployment.  
 
6.10. Atkinson et al (2000) reported that there was virtually no negative 
feedback from clients in the random assignment areas about the fact that the 
provision available to clients was determined by chance. However, the 
activities undertaken by the two groups in one of the areas were not 
particularly different due to widespread use of the pre-existing WBLA training 
courses for pilot participants that were also available to non-participants. 
 
6.11. The analysis by Wilkinson (2002a; 2002b) focuses on the two random 
assignment pilot areas whilst Lissenburgh (2001b) is concerned with the other 
26 pilot areas.  
 
6.12. In each case pilot participants were compared with non-participants. In 
the random assignment areas the comparison was with non-participants who 
were assigned into standard provision in the same areas. In the other areas 
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pilot participants were compared with JSA claimants reaching 12 or 18 
months unemployment duration outside the pilot areas1. 
 
6.13. In each case survey data was collected roughly 18 months after 
participants entered the pilots. This data was used to derive the required 
outcome measures. For the random assignment areas a direct comparison of 
outcome measures was possible because assignment to the pilot or other 
provision was done at random2. However, for the other areas, pilot 
participants needed to be matched with other JSA claimants to ensure that on 
average they had similar characteristics. This matching was undertaken at a 
very detailed level using administrative data that pre-dated pilot entry plus 
data from an additional survey of participants and non-participants conducted 
roughly seven months after pilot entry.   
 
6.14. The outcome measures from the surveys are more detailed than 
available from administrative data allowing for a more comprehensive 
assessment of the impact of ND25 plus. In each study employment entry and 
unemployment exit were considered, but the survey data allows an additional 
assessment of some measures of employability and job quality. 
 
6.15. The timing of entry to the pilots is also important here because many of 
the comparison group will enter ND25 plus when they reach 24 months 
continuous unemployment. In the pilots, entry occurs after 12 or 18 months 
dependent on the area. For the non-random assignment areas pilot entrants 
between December 1998 and February 1999 were considered. 
 
6.16. In the random assignment areas, the administrative data analysis 
covered all entrants between November 1998 and March 2001. The surveys, 
however, were limited to a rather complex subgroup of entrants. First, 
entrants between November 1998 and March 1999 with 12 or 18 months 
unemployment (dependent on area) were surveyed. A later cohort of entrants 
were also surveyed consisting of all pilot entrants between February and May 
20003.  Comparators from the first cohort would enter the original national 
programme, whilst most comparators from the second cohort would enter the 
enhanced national programme. Differences between the original and 
enhanced national programme were fairly minimal so in all cases we should 
interpret the research as comparing the pilots with existing national provision 
that may or may not entail entry to national ND25 plus prior to the introduction 
of the re-engineered programme. 
 
                                            
1 Note that at the time the pilots were in operation entry to ND25 plus in non-pilot areas was 
after 24 months unemployment duration. 
2 Some problems with administrative data collection meant that identification of the exact 
group of non-participants was not possible. A pool of potential comparison group members 
could be identified and from this pool some matching using available administrative data was 
done to identify a comparison group.  
3 Note entry to ND25 plus occurred at Restart anniversaries so that entry to pilots could occur 
after 24 months continuous unemployment or more.  For the first entry cohort only 12/18 
month entrants were considered, but for the later cohort all possible pilot entrants were 
considered. 
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6.17. The survey in non-random assignment areas consisted of 979 
participants from the 26 pilot areas and 563 members of a comparison 
sample. The administrative data analysis in the random assignment areas 
covered 3,281 pilot participants and 3,281 non-participants, whilst the surveys 
covered 353 pilot participants and 323 members of the comparison group.  
 
 
The impact on leaving unemployment 
 
6.18. Both surveys and the administrative data indicate that roughly eight per 
cent more pilot participants had left JSA 18 months after entering ND25 plus 
than members of the comparison group. The differences were found to be 
statistically significant and roughly double the estimated impact of national 
provision from the macroeconomic analysis. There was a much larger effect in 
one of the random assignment areas for entrants after April 2000, but 
research in this area (Lakey, 2000) suggests that this was more to do with 
administrative issues in relation to the managing of the pilot4.  
 
 
Employment Entry 
 
6.19. In terms of employment entry there was some evidence that pilot 
participants were more likely to leave JSA to go into work. However, in much 
of the analysis the differences were only weakly statistically significant5. The 
only strongly significant result was in the problem random assignment area 
discussed above. For the national pilot areas the increase in entry to work 
was around four per cent, whilst in the other random assignment area it was 
five per cent.  
 
6.20. Similar evidence comes from analysis of employment status at the time 
of the surveys In non-random assignment areas roughly four per cent more 
pilot participants were in employment than their comparators and in the stable 
random assignment area the difference was five per cent.  Both differences 
were not statistically significant.  
 
 
Employability measures 
 
6.21. One of the key objectives of the programme was to increase the 
employability of long-term unemployed jobseekers. To assess this, survey 
participants not in employment at the time of the surveys were asked a range 
                                            
4 Administrative problems in one of the random assignment pilot areas meant a change in the 
ND25 plus provider from a Joint Venture Partnership between ES and the local TEC to just 
ES management from June 2000). Many of the survey respondents in this area were affected 
by this change and after a period where pilot effects were often small and insignificant they 
became very big. It is difficult to believe the magnitude of such impacts, particularly in relation 
to fairly consistent other results, so many of these results need to be treated with caution.  
5 By weakly significant we mean statistically significant at the 10% significance level, 
statistically significant by conventional significance levels means significant at the 5% 
significance level, whilst strongly significant means statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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of questions to assess employability. These included human capital 
measures, job search behaviour, self-efficacy and attachment to the labour 
market. In general, no increase in employability according to these measures 
was detectable.   
 
 
Job quality 
 
6.22. There is also concern that although ND25 plus participants are moving 
into work, the quality of jobs they take up maybe poor, with clients entering 
low paid, mainly part-time and temporary employment with few development 
opportunities. Evidence of this nature can only be assessed relative to jobs 
taken up by the comparison group of non-participants. 
 
6.23. The evidence finds very few differences in the quality of jobs for those 
that did find employment. The only reliable differences in the non-random 
assignment areas was that pilot respondents had lower levels of job 
satisfaction.  
 
6.24. In the random assignment areas there were some significant 
differences, but a very mixed picture. In both areas average hourly pay was 
lower for pilot participants. In one area this was accompanied by more full-
time jobs, fewer temporary jobs and more pilot participants received training, 
all indicating higher quality jobs. However, in the other area there were fewer 
full-time jobs, more temporary jobs and less pilot participants received 
training.  
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7. ND25 plus impact for different client 
groups 
 
7.1. The focus of the remainder of the report is on ND25 plus participants. In 
this section some simple analysis of administrative data about ND25 plus 
participants from the NDED is presented to highlight the composition of the 
ND25 plus client group, how they progress through the programme and where 
they go when they leave the programme. Five separate breaks are covered: 
by gender, then by age, by ethnicity, by whether they had a disability and by 
the time spent in unemployment on entry to the programme.  
 
7.2. Data for all ND25 plus participants in national areas is included in the 
NDED, however, data for pilot participants was collected using a different 
system. There were problems with pilot data collection so not all pilot 
participants were included in the NDED.  It is unclear how many pilot 
participants are excluded from the database. Despite this problem NDED 
covers the vast majority of ND25 plus participants and all participants from 
April 2001 onwards (when the pilots ceased to operate). It is used as the 
basis for Statistical First Releases about ND25 plus. 
 
 
Differences by Gender 
 
7.3. Table 7.1 shows that roughly one in six ND25 plus entrants were women, 
a proportion that was broadly constant throughout the period under 
consideration. 
 
7.4. There were very few differences between men and women in their 
progress through and outcomes from ND25 plus. A similar proportion of men 
and women left ND25 plus at each of the different stages. Although a slightly 
higher percentage of men (20 compared with 18) entered AIP/Gateway 
opportunities or the IAP. Within this stage a slightly higher percentage of 
women went into WBLA (29 per cent compared with 26 per cent).  
 
7.5. A higher percentage of female leavers transferred to other benefits (15 
per cent compared with 12 per cent for men), whilst fewer women left ND25 
plus to return to JSA (46 per cent compared with 50 per cent for men).  
 
7.6. The percentage going into employment was roughly the same for men 
and women and was also roughly the same for different categories of 
employment. 
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Table 7.1 ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Gender 
 All Men Women 
    
Number on ND25 plus (‘000s) 496.9 411.4 79.5 
Stage Left ND25 plus    
Pre-Gateway 4 4 5 
Gateway  80 80 80 
IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities 8 8 8 
Follow-through 8 8 7 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
20 20 18 
Of which, percentage into:    
Subsidised Employment  24 24 23 
Work experience placement 13 13 13 
Full-time Education or Training 10 10 9 
IAP Training 16 15 15 
WBLA 26 26 29 
BET/Basic Skills  8 7 8 
Other Opportunity 3 4 3 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 17 17 17 
Transfer to Other Benefits 13 12 15 
Other 8 7 9 
Unknown  13 13 13 
Return to JSA 49 50 46 
Percentage into Employment    
Sustained unsubsidised 16 16 16 
Sustained subsidised 4 4 3 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 4 4 3 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 1 
There were 5998 people on the database where the gender information is missing. 
 
 
Differences by Age 
 
7.7. Figure 7.1 plots the age profile of entrants over time. The vast majority of 
ND25 plus entrants are aged 25 to 49. Under the original and enhanced 
national programmes this age group constituted roughly 70 per cent of 
entrants. However, once the entry criteria were reduced to 18 months the 
percentage of entrants aged 25-49 increased to around 75 per cent. For this 
group the IAP is a mandatory part of the programme, whilst for people aged 
50 plus, it remained voluntary throughout the programme. 
 
7.8. The largest change in ND25 plus entrants came from those aged 25-29 
who constituted 16 per cent of entrants at the beginning of the programme, 
then under ten per cent just before the programme was re-engineered. After 
the re-engineering the percentage of entrants age 25-29 increased back up to 
16 per cent by the middle of 2002.  
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7.9. Changes for other age groups were far more modest. Throughout the 
period under consideration roughly 15 per cent of entrants were aged 50-54 
and a further 15 per cent aged 55-59, with less than one per cent of entrants 
aged 60 or more. The percentage of older entrants fell after April 2001 
offsetting the increase in younger entrants.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Entrants by age group over time 
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7.10. Older jobseekers were seen by ES staff and employers as being more 
attractive than young people in terms of employment. They are more likely to 
have a driving license, some work experience and transferable skills. In 
addition they are likely to have less chaotic lifestyles (The Tavistock Institute, 
1999) and they were felt to be more reliable and trustworthy, have more 
common sense and better inter-personal skills and more likely to stick to the 
job (Atkinson et al, 2000). However, the 50 plus age group is seen as 
problematic. Some employers see them as difficult to retrain or not worth 
retraining and some clients can be reluctant to retrain. Those who are willing 
to retrain were well regarded by employers.  
 
7.11. Under the re-engineered programme participation beyond the Gateway 
was not compulsory for clients aged 50 plus, so that NDPAs had to sell the 
programme to these clients. Many Advisers felt that IAP could be beneficial 
for this age group (Wilson, 2002) and Winterbotham et al, (2002) report that a 
significant proportion of these clients do participate and these were split 
between those who were keen to work and retrain and those who were under 
the impression that they had to participate.  
 
7.12. The majority of ND25 plus participants were aged 25-49. However, 
Table 7.2a shows that there were roughly 140,000 entrants aged 50 or more. 
These older clients were generally less likely to leave the programme before 
the Gateway (3.1 per cent aged 50-59 left Pre-Gateway compared with 4.8 
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per cent aged 25-49). The exception to this was the 60 plus age group, where 
13 per cent of clients left Pre-Gateway. 
 
7.13. Given the voluntary nature of post Gateway stages throughout the 
programme, older participants were less likely to enter the IAP and Follow-
through. For those entering the IAP or AIP/Gateway Oportunity 46 per cent of 
participants aged 60+ entered subsidised employment, compared with around 
23 per cent aged 25-49, and around 30 per cent aged 50-59. In contrast a 
much lower percentage of older clients participated in a work experience 
placement (around 6-8 per cent aged 50+ compared with 15 per cent aged 
25-49).  
 
 
Table 7.2a ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Age Group 
 All Aged 
25-49 
Aged 
50-54 
Aged 
55-59 
Aged 
60+ 
      
Number on ND25 plus 
(‘000s) 
496.9 360.8 69.3 63.6 3.0 
Stage Left ND25 plus      
Pre-Gateway 4.4 4.8 3.1 3.1 13.0 
Gateway  79.6 76.6 85.1 89.1 83.1 
IAP or AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities 
8.1 9.3 6.0 4.1 2.8 
Follow-through 8.0 9.3 5.8 3.7 1.1 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
20 23 13 9 5 
Of which, percentage into:      
Subsidised Employment  24 23 29 33 46 
Work experience placement 13 15 6 6 8 
Full-time Education or 
Training 
10 10 8 7 7 
IAP Training 16 17 9 8 13 
WBLA 26 24 38 38 15 
BET/Basic Skills  8 8 5 5 6 
Other Opportunity 3 3 3 3 6 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 17 20 14 9 6 
Transfer to Other Benefits 13 12 12 18 43 
Other 8 8 8 8 6 
Unknown  13 14 9 11 25 
Return to JSA 49 47 57 54 20 
Percentage into Employment: 
Sustained unsubsidised 16 18 14 9 6 
Sustained subsidised 4 4 3 2 2 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 4 5 3 2 1 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 + + + 
There were 490 people on the database where the age information is missing. 
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7.14. Slightly fewer older clients participated in full-time education and training 
or IAP Training, but for those aged 50-59, 38 per cent of IAP entrants went 
into WBLA compared with 15 per cent aged 60 plus and 24 per cent aged 25-
49.  
 
7.15. The percentage of ND25 plus leavers going into unsubsidised 
employment declined with age. 20 per cent of participants aged 25-49 left to 
unsubsidised employment compared with 14 per cent aged 50-54, nine per 
cent aged 55-59 and six per cent aged 60 plus. Older participants were more 
likely to transfer to other benefits: 43 per cent of clients aged 60plus, 18 per 
cent aged 55-59 and just 12 per cent aged under 55. For the under 60s 
roughly a half of all leavers returned to JSA. Here the percentage was higher 
for the 50-54 and 55-59 age groups. Only one in five ND25 plus leavers aged 
60 or over returned to JSA. 
 
7.16. The 25-49 age group were most likely to go into any form of 
employment, particularly sustained unsubsidised employment (18 per cent), 
but for the 50-54 group the percentage into sustained unsubsidised 
employment was also fairly high at 14 per cent. Less than 10 per cent of 
leavers aged 55plus went into sustained unsubsidised employment. 
 
7.17. The 25-49 age group is broken down further in Table 7.2b. Here the 
patterns by age group remain within this fairly large age band. More younger 
participants left before the Gateway and also more younger participants left 
from the IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities and the Follow-through.  
 
7.18. Younger participants were also more likely to take part in subsidised 
employment and leave the programme to unsubsidised employment. 
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Table 7.2b ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Age Group, for 
participants aged 25-49 
 Aged 
25-29 
Aged 
30-34 
Aged 
35-39 
Aged 
40-44 
Aged 
45-49 
      
Number on ND25 plus 
(‘000s) 
66.2 84.6 78.2 67.5 64.4 
Stage Left ND25 plus      
Pre-Gateway 5.9 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.8 
Gateway  73.5 75.9 77.1 77.9 79.0 
IAP or AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities 
10.5 9.7 9.2 8.8 8.5 
Follow-through 10.1 9.2 9.2 9.2 8.7 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
25 23 23 23 22 
Of which, percentage into:      
Subsidised Employment  26 24 21 20 20 
Work experience placement 13 14 15 16 16 
Full-time Education or 
Training 
13 11 10 9 8 
IAP Training 16 16 17 17 17 
WBLA 22 24 25 25 26 
BET/Basic Skills  7 7 9 9 9 
Other Opportunity 3 4 4 4 4 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 23 21 20 19 17 
Transfer to Other Benefits 10 11 12 13 14 
Other 8 7 7 7 7 
Unknown  17 16 14 13 11 
Return to JSA 42 45 47 49 52 
Percentage into Employment: 
Sustained unsubsidised 21 19 18 17 16 
Sustained subsidised 5 5 4 4 4 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 6 5 5 4 4 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 1 1 1 
There were 490 people on the database where the age information is missing. 
 
 
Ethnic Minority Groups 
 
7.19. The percentage of ethnic minority entrants increased over time from 
roughly 10 per cent of entrants when ND25 plus began to around 14 per cent 
by the end of 2001. Throughout the period there were roughly four per cent of 
ND25 plus participants who preferred not to report their ethnic background. In 
addition a small minority of participants did not report their ethnic origin. The 
percentage not reporting ethnicity was around two per cent for the first two 
quarters of entrants, but fell to less than one per cent by the second quarter of 
1999 and has been around 0.1 per cent since the fourth quarter of 2000. 
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7.20. Figure 7.2 plots the ethnic group for ethnic minorities. The largest two 
groups are Black Caribbean and Mixed/Other backgrounds both constituting 
27 per cent of all ethnic minority entrants. The trends in entry for these two 
groups, however, are very different. For the first two years of entrants, 30 per 
cent of ethnic minority entrants were Black Caribbean, but this has fallen to a 
little over 20 per cent of ethnic minority entrants under the re-engineered 
programme. For the first two years of entrants, 25 per cent of ethnic minority 
entrants were from Mixed/Other ethnic groups, but this rose to over 30 per 
cent of ethnic minority entrants in 2002.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Ethnic Group of Ethnic Minority Entrants over time 
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7.21. Black African, Indian and Pakistani each constitute just over 10 per cent 
of ND25 plus entrants over time, whilst participants from Other Black groups 
made up roughly seven per cent of ethnic minority entrants and Bangladeshi 
clients accounted for around four per cent of entrants.  
 
7.22. Table 7.3a compares differences between ethnic minorities as a whole 
with the White population, whilst Tables 7.3b and 7.3c compare differences by 
ethnic groups. 
 
7.23. In general the pattern of participation was similar between whites and 
ethnic minorities. For each group 20 per cent of participants entered the IAP 
or AIP/Gateway opportunities. However, when considering what they did on 
this stage of the programme large differences emerge.  
 
7.24. Only 11 per cent of ethnic minority entrants went into subsidised 
employment compared with 26 per cent of White entrants. However, there is 
no difference between the groups in the percentage going into work 
experience placements.  
 
7.25. The difference in the employment subsidy percentages is offset by a 
higher percentage of ethnic minority entrants going into IAP training and BET 
41  
New Deal for people aged 25 and over: A synthesis report 
or basic skills courses. This may not be too surprising with ethnic minorities 
more likely to have literacy problems to address. This is explored further when 
considering different ethnic groups below.  
 
 
Table 7.3a ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Ethnicity 
 All White Not White 
    
Number on ND25 plus (‘000s) 496.9 415.8 55.8 
Stage Left ND25 plus    
Pre-Gateway 4 4 5 
Gateway  80 80 79 
IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities 8 8 7 
Follow-through 8 8 8 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
20 20 20 
Of which, percentage into:    
Subsidised Employment  24 26 11 
Work experience placement 13 13 13 
Full-time Education or Training 10 10 12 
IAP Training 16 15 20 
WBLA 26 26 27 
BET/Basic Skills  8 7 15 
Other Opportunity 3 4 2 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 17 17 18 
Transfer to Other Benefits 13 13 11 
Other 8 7 10 
Unknown  13 12 16 
Return to JSA 49 50 46 
Percentage into Employment    
Sustained unsubsidised 16 16 16 
Sustained subsidised 4 4 2 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 4 4 4 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 + 
There were 21679 people on the database who preferred not to state their ethnic origin and 3,590 
people where ethnicity was not recorded. 
 
7.26. Despite these differences the pattern of exit destinations were fairly 
similar. Roughly the same percentage of White and Ethnic minority ND25 plus 
leavers went into unsubsidised employment. Ethnic minority ND25 plus 
leavers were slightly less likely to transfer to other benefits and more likely to 
leave to other known or unknown destinations. For both groups the largest 
proportion of leavers returned to JSA. For ethnic minorities this was 46 per 
cent compared with 50 per cent of White ND25 plus leavers.  
 
7.27. Ethnic minorities were slightly less likely to enter some form of 
employment (22 per cent of ethnic minority participants compared with 25 per 
cent of White participants). This difference was exclusively due to differences 
in entry to subsidised employment. Given the differences in percentages 
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entering subsidised employment as part of the IAP or AIP/Gateway 
opportunities, this finding is to be expected.  
 
7.28. Tables 7.3b and 7.3c provide further detail for specific ethnic minority 
groups. Indians and each of the Black groups had a slightly higher percentage 
of Pre-Gateway leavers. Fewer Blacks were Gateway leavers, but for other 
groups differences in the stage left ND25 plus were not great.  
 
 
Table 7.3b ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Ethnicity 
 Black 
Caribbean 
Black 
African 
Black  
- Other  
    
Number on ND25 plus (‘000s) 15.1 7.5 3.8 
Stage Left ND25 plus    
Pre-Gateway 6 6 6 
Gateway  79 78 77 
IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities 6 7 7 
Follow-through 8 9 10 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
19 21 21 
Of which, percentage into:    
Subsidised Employment  10 6 12 
Work experience placement 14 15 14 
Full-time Education or Training 15 12 11 
IAP Training 22 23 22 
WBLA 30 28 30 
BET/Basic Skills  7 14 8 
Other Opportunity 2 2 3 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 16 18 17 
Transfer to Other Benefits 9 9 10 
Other 9 11 9 
Unknown  16 19 18 
Return to JSA 51 43 47 
Percentage into Employment    
Sustained unsubsidised 14 16 15 
Sustained subsidised 2 1 2 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 5 4 5 
Subsidised <13 weeks + + + 
There were 21679 people on the database who preferred not to state their ethnic origin and 3,590 
people where ethnicity was not recorded. 
 
7.29. The percentage of participants entering the IAP or AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities varied a little from 19 per cent (Black Caribbean, Indian and 
Bangladeshi) to 21 per cent (Black African, Black Other, Mixed/Other). 
However, there was a lot of variation across groups in the type of opportunity 
entered.  
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7.30. Indians were the most likely to enter subsidised employment (19 per 
cent) followed by Bangladeshis (16 per cent). Only six per cent of Black 
Africans entered subsidised employment, whilst for other groups roughly 10 
per cent of entrants went into subsidised employment. 
 
 
Table 7.3c ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Ethnicity 
 Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Mixed/Other
     
Number on ND25 plus 
(‘000s) 
5.7 6.7 2.0 15.1 
Stage Left ND25 plus     
Pre-Gateway 6 5 5 5 
Gateway  80 80 79 79 
IAP or AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities 
8 8 8 8 
Follow-through 7 8 8 8 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
19 20 19 21 
Of which, percentage into:     
Subsidised Employment  19 16 12 10 
Work experience placement 15 11 7 13 
Full-time Education or 
Training 
8 8 15 11 
IAP Training 17 16 10 19 
WBLA 26 23 24 25 
BET/Basic Skills  13 24 31 20 
Other Opportunity 2 1 1 3 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 18 17 22 20 
Transfer to Other Benefits 12 13 14 11 
Other 11 10 11 10 
Unknown  16 15 12 15 
Return to JSA 43 45 40 44 
Percentage into 
Employment 
    
Sustained unsubsidised 17 16 20 17 
Sustained subsidised 3 3 2 2 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 4 3 3 4 
Subsidised <13 weeks + + + + 
There were 21679 people on the database who preferred not to state their ethnic origin and 3,590 
people where ethnicity was not recorded. 
 
7.31. There was much less variation in entry to work experience placements. 
For most groups 13-15 per cent of entrants went on such placements. 
However, the percentages were much lower for Bangladeshis (seven per 
cent) and slightly lower for Pakistanis  (11 per cent).   
 
7.32. There were large variations by group in the percentage of entrants going 
into BET or basic skills courses. Over 30 per cent of Bangladeshis undertook 
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this activity compared with Black Caribbeans (seven per cent) and Other 
Blacks (eight per cent). Pakistanis (24 per cent) and Mixed/Other groups (20 
per cent) were also more likely to enter BET or basic skills courses. 
 
7.33. Black groups were slightly more likely to take part in WBLA or IAP 
training (28-30 per cent in WBLA and 22-23 per cent in IAP training ) 
compared with other minority groups (23-26 per cent in WBLA and 10-19 per 
cent IAP training). 
 
7.34. Indians and Pakistanis were less likely to enter full-time education or 
training (eight per cent compared with 11-15 per cent for other groups.  
 
7.35. Exit destinations were less variable across groups. Return to JSA was 
the most common exit destination for all groups, but this was most likely for 
Black Caribbean ND25 plus leavers (51 per cent) and least common for 
Bangladeshi leavers (40 per cent). Bangladeshi leavers were most likely to 
enter unsubsidised employment (22 per cent), followed by Mixed/Other 
leavers (20 per cent). There was little variation among other groups (16-18 
per cent). 
 
7.36. There was little variation in exits to other known destinations. Blacks 
were slightly less likely to transfer to other benefits than other groups, but 
slightly more likely to leave to unknown destinations.  
 
 
Differences for people with disabilities 
 
7.37. The percentage of ND25 plus entrants recorded as having a disability 
increased from roughly 20 per cent of entrants under the original national 
programme to 23 per cent under the enhanced national programme and to 27 
per cent under the re-engineered programme. These clients are eligible for 
early entry to ND25 plus, but not all people with disabilities will be early 
entrants.  
 
7.38. Table 7.4 shows that across a range of outcome measures there are 
few differences between people with and without disabilities. For both groups, 
the percentage of people who left ND25 plus at different stages was roughly 
the same and the percentage of each group entering the IAP or AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities was also roughly the same.  
 
7.39. There were only small differences in the type of opportunity entered. 
People with disabilities were slightly more likely to have entered subsidised 
employment (25 per cent compared with 23 per cent for people without 
disabilities) and less likely to have entered WBLA (24 per cent compared with 
27 per cent for people without disabilities).  
 
7.40. Exit destinations were slightly different with 18 per cent of people with 
disabilities leaving ND25 plus to transfer to other benefits compared with 11 
per cent of people without disabilities. Offsetting this difference were slightly 
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lower percentages of people with disabilities going to all the other 
destinations.  
 
7.41. There was also a small difference in the percentage of people entering 
any form of employment, with a slightly lower percentage for people with 
disabilities than people without disabilities (24 per cent compared with 26 per 
cent). This difference was entirely explained by a lower percentage of people 
with disabilities going into sustained unsubsidised employment. 
 
 
Table 7.4 ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Disability 
 All People with 
disabilities 
People 
without 
disabilities 
    
Number on ND25 plus (‘000s) 496.9 111.0 385.8 
Stage Left ND25 plus    
Pre-Gateway 4 4 5 
Gateway  80 80 80 
IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities 8 9 8 
Follow-through 8 8 8 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
20 21 20 
Of which, percentage into:    
Subsidised Employment  24 25 23 
Work experience placement 13 13 13 
Full-time Education or Training 10 10 9 
IAP Training 16 15 16 
WBLA 26 24 27 
BET/Basic Skills  8 9 7 
Other Opportunity 3 4 3 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 17 16 18 
Transfer to Other Benefits 13 18 11 
Other 8 7 8 
Unknown  13 12 13 
Return to JSA 49 46 50 
Percentage into Employment    
Sustained unsubsidised 16 15 17 
Sustained subsidised 4 4 4 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 4 4 4 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 1 
 
 
Early entrants and unemployment duration 
 
7.42. Finally the time spent in the unemployment spell prior to entry to ND25 
plus is shown in Figure 7.3. There are big differences in the composition of 
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entrants over time, partly driven by the change in entry criteria, but also due to 
changes in unemployment composition.  
 
7.43. When ND25 plus was introduced, one in ten entrants had been 
unemployed for less than two years, around 30 per cent for 2-3 years, 27 per 
cent for 3-5 years and 34 per cent for five years or more. The percentage of 
entrants with longer unemployment duration fell over time because entry 
occurred at annual restart interviews for these jobseekers and participation in 
ND25 plus could influence the length of their JSA claim. In 2002 less than ten 
per cent of entrants had been unemployed for five years or more and less 
than ten per cent for 3-5 years. Entrants with two to three years 
unemployment increased slightly through the original and enhanced national 
programmes to roughly 40 per cent of entrants in 2000, but once the entry 
criteria changed to limit qualification to 18 months unemployment the 
percentage of entrants with two to three years unemployment started to fall to 
around 20 per cent for the middle quarters of 2001 and below ten per cent for 
subsequent quarters. 
 
7.44. Entrants with less than two years unemployment increased steadily 
through the original and enhanced national programmes from the starting 10 
per cent to close to 20 per cent, representing an increasing entry for people 
from disadvantaged groups who could enter ND25 plus early. The change to 
the re-engineered programme and the reduction in unemployment time 
required for entry meant that since April 2001 over two-thirds of entrants have 
unemployment spells of less than two years on entry.  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Entrants by time spent unemployed over time 
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7.45. Entry to ND25 plus was set at 24 months continuous unemployment 
under the original and enhanced national programmes, then changed to 18 
months or 18 out of 21 months under the re-engineered programme. 
Throughout the programme early entry was possible for clearly disadvantaged 
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groups including people with disabilities, ex-offenders, homeless people, 
refugees, people recovering from drug addiction.  
 
7.46. Overall, there have been roughly 92,000 people that entered ND25 plus 
before reaching the standard unemployment duration entry criteria. Molloy 
and Ritchie (2000) reported that those who viewed ND25 plus positively 
advocated early entry to prevent the period of unemployment lengthening. 
Winterbotham et al (2002) also report that ES staff felt strongly that eligibility 
should be reduced from 18 months to 12 months or even six months. In the 
re-engineered programme they feel that the programme has the tools to help 
the unemployed back to work or to improve their employability and the sooner 
they can help clients the less likely they are to develop bad habits.  
 
7.47. Early entry does not always occur for potential entrants for two reasons. 
Early entry was often only agreed when Advisers think that a piece of training 
would enhance a client’s employability. Hence, some potential early entrants 
are rejected. In addition, in the re-engineered programme, once the 
mandatory nature of the IAP is discussed many clients lose interest 
(Winterbotham et al, 2002). 
 
7.48. Relative to regular ND25 plus entrants, there were some big differences 
for early entrants in the outcome measure shown in Table 7.5a. Fewer (73 per 
cent compared with 81 per cent) early entrants left ND25 plus from the 
Gateway. This difference is offset by ten per cent more early entrants than 
regular entrants going into the IAP or AIP/Gateway opportunities. This reflects 
the view that, certainly in the re-engineered programme, early entry is in some 
way contingent in participation in the IAP.  
 
7.49. There were also big differences in the types of opportunities entered. 
Early entrants were more likely to participate in work experience placements, 
IAP training and BET/Basic skills courses and correspondingly less likely to 
go into WBLA than regular entrants. This is not surprising because for most 
early entrants WBLA was available without participating in ND25 plus.  
 
7.50. There were also differences in the exit destinations for ND25 plus 
leavers. One-quarter of early entrants left ND25 plus for unsubsidised 
employment compared with one in six of regular entrants. This may be a 
reflection of them being more likely to participate in an employment related 
opportunity, but also probably reflects that to be early they have to display 
high levels of motivation to participate in the programme and in employment. 
Early entrants were also more likely to leave to unknown destinations, which 
may also represent greater moves into employment. These differences were 
offset by fewer early entrants leaving ND25 plus to return to claim JSA.  
 
7.51. Overall one third of early entrants went into some form of employment 
compared with one-quarter of regular entrants. Early entrants were more likely 
to enter sustained unsubsidised employment.  
 
7.52. From this evidence early entry seems to be a great success story for 
ND25 plus. As discussed above this may be because early entrants display 
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greater motivation in order to become early entrants, but the evidence clearly 
shows that the opportunity for early entry produces better employment related 
outcomes than for regular entrants.  
 
 
Table 7.5a ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Early Entry 
 All Early Entry Normal 
Entry 
    
Number on ND25 plus (‘000s) 496.9 65.6 425.3 
Stage Left ND25 plus    
Pre-Gateway 4 4 4 
Gateway  80 67 81 
IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities 8 16 7 
Follow-through 8 13 7 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
20 35 18 
Of which, percentage into:    
Subsidised Employment  24 33 21 
Work experience placement 13 14 13 
Full-time Education or Training 10 12 9 
IAP Training 16 16 15 
WBLA 26 13 31 
BET/Basic Skills  8 7 8 
Other Opportunity 3 5 3 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 17 25 16 
Transfer to Other Benefits 13 11 13 
Other 8 9 7 
Unknown  13 18 12 
Return to JSA 49 37 51 
Percentage into Employment    
Sustained unsubsidised 16 22 15 
Sustained subsidised 4 9 3 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 4 7 4 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 + 
 
7.53. It has also been argued that jobseekers with very long unemployment 
durations are extremely disadvantaged in the labour market. They may also 
possess some of the eligibility criteria for early entry, but due to lack of 
motivation do not take up opportunities until required to do so. 
 
7.54. Atkinson et al (2000) reported that employers did not distinguish 
between 12, 18 or 24 months unemployment, but for duration beyond this 
there was further concern about the suitability for employment of the 
individual.  
 
7.55. There is a clear relationship between duration of qualifying 
unemployment claim and progress through ND25 plus. We have seen that 
early entrants were more likely to stay on ND25 plus beyond the Gateway and 
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enter subsidised employment, and leave ND25 plus to employment. These 
early entrants would enter ND25 plus with less than two years unemployment 
duration and most of the above conclusions hold for the less than two-year 
duration category relative to all others shown in Table 7.5b.  
 
7.56. Table 7.5b also shows that there was a trend over unemployment 
duration in nearly all measures. The percentage of ND25 plus participants that 
left unemployment from the Gateway was 73 per cent for those with less than 
2 years unemployment, 81 per cent for 2-3 years, 83 per cent for 3-5 years 
and 86 per cent for 5 years or more duration. Clearly, the longer duration 
participants were less likely to participate in ND25 plus post-Gateway, 
reflecting the view from NDPAs that some compulsion was needed for some 
disadvantaged clients. 
 
Table 7.5b ND25 plus Outcomes since June 1998 by Qualifying 
Unemployment Claim Duration 
 <2 years 2-3 
years 
3-5 years 5+ years 
     
Number on ND25 plus 
(‘000s) 
147.7 137.4 96.0 99.9 
Stage Left ND25 plus     
Pre-Gateway 5 4 3 3 
Gateway  73 81 83 86 
IAP or AIP/Gateway 
Opportunities 
12 7 7 5 
Follow-through 11 8 7 6 
Percentage Entering IAP or 
AIP/Gateway Opportunities 
29 17 16 13 
Of which, percentage into:     
Subsidised Employment  22 25 22 21 
Work experience placement 20 8 10 7 
Full-time Education or 
Training 
7 12 14 12 
IAP Training 23 11 10 8 
WBLA 12 38 37 45 
BET/Basic Skills  11 5 6 5 
Other Opportunity 6 2 2 1 
Exit destination, percentage leaving to: 
Unsubsidised Employment 26 17 13 9 
Transfer to Other Benefits 16 12 11 12 
Other 10 7 7 6 
Unknown  18 13 11 9 
Return to JSA 30 51 57 64 
Percentage into Employment     
Sustained unsubsidised 22 17 13 9 
Sustained subsidised 5 4 3 2 
Unsubsidised <13 weeks 6 4 3 2 
Subsidised <13 weeks 1 1 + + 
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7.57. Differences also show up strongly in the percentage of participants 
entering the IAP or AIP/Gateway Opportunities. 29 per cent of participants 
entered these opportunities who had a duration of less than two years 
compared with 17, 16 and 13 per cent with two to three, three to five and five 
or more years.  
 
7.58. There are stark differences in the type of opportunity undertaken. The 
longer the unemployment duration, the more likely the participant was to have 
participated in a WBLA Opportunity. 45 per cent of participants with five years 
or more unemployment entered WBLA compared with 37 or 38 for 2-3 and 3-
5 years unemployment and just 12 per cent of the less than 2 years group. 
The less than 2 years duration entrants were more likely (23 per cent of them) 
to enter IAP Training than longer duration categories (around ten per cent) 
and also more likely to enter BET or basic skills training (11 per cent against 
roughly five per cent).   
 
7.59. Longer duration entrants were also more likely to return to JSA when 
they leave ND25 plus. 64 per cent of entrants with 5 or more years claim 
duration returned to JSA compared with 57 per cent (3-5 years), 51 per cent 
(2-3 years) and 30 per cent (less than 2 years). 
 
7.60. The percentage of leavers going into employment also reduced as 
unemployment duration increased. 13 per cent with five or more years claim 
duration went into employment and nine per cent into sustained unsubsidised 
employment, whilst for the less than two years claim duration group 34 per 
cent went into employment and 22 per cent went into sustained unsubsidised 
employment.  
 
 
Identifying hard-to-help groups 
 
7.61. We know that in general ND25 plus participants have many 
disadvantages, not least the fact that they have been unemployed for a long 
time. We have also seen that they often lack motivation to work, and have a 
lack of qualifications and up-to-date skills. Legard et al, (2000) found that half 
of the participants interviewed had left continuous full-time education at, or 
before, the age of 16 without obtaining any qualifications. The clients 
themselves also see other barriers to employment including discrimination, 
the benefits trap, labour market competition, transport and family 
responsibilities (Tavistock, 1999, Legard et al, 2000 and Molloy and Ricthie, 
2000).  
 
7.62. Legard et al, (2000) reported that participants had a mixture of previous 
labour market experience ranging from stable employment to little or no 
previous employment. The most prevalent pattern was of having had a 
number of jobs interspersed with long spells of unemployment. One of the key 
challenges of ND25 plus was to break this repeating pattern.  
 
7.63. There have been concerns that ND25 plus has worked better for some 
clients than others and in particularly performance was poorest for some key 
51  
New Deal for people aged 25 and over: A synthesis report 
identifiable client groups, termed “hard to help”. The above analysis allows for 
some identification of hard-to-help groups. The easiest way to define such 
groups is probably by considering groups with the lowest percentage of 
participants leaving ND25 plus to go into employment, particularly sustained 
employment.  
 
7.64. We have seen that people with an extremely long time claiming JSA 
before entering the programme were much less likely to go into either 
subsidised or unsubsidised sustained employment. Furthermore, we noted 
that employers did not strongly distinguish between 12, 18 or 24 months 
unemployment but did have concerns about longer durations. These clients 
can easily be identified as being hard to help.  
 
7.65. There may be underlying characteristics of these very long-term 
unemployed that make them pre-disposed to very long unemployment spells 
and it would be beneficial for these characteristics to be identified early in 
spells so that the additional characteristics of being very long-term 
unemployed does not add to their disadvantage. There is clearly a problem 
with a stock of extremely disadvantaged clients going through the programme. 
Advisers report that for BET/basic skills IAP participants, the training has often 
been insufficient, so for these groups extending the length of the programme 
intervention may lead to more positive outcomes.  
 
7.66. Employers also identified concerns with lack of motivation, a criminal 
record, substance abuse, language problems and mental health problems. 
These groups must therefore be identified as potentially hard-to-help, 
although in many cases identification of such problems is far from straight 
forward. Many of these groups are eligible for early entry to ND25 plus and we 
have seen that early entry produces better outcomes than regular entry. 
However, early entry is a voluntary option so these positive outcomes may be 
related to hard to identify characteristics of early entrants, particularly in 
relation to motivation to participate and find work. The evidence suggests that 
early identification of disadvantage and early provision of support for 
identifiable disadvantaged groups may lead to more positive outcomes.  
 
7.67. Older clients may be perceived as disadvantaged, although given that a 
large part of ND25 plus remains voluntary for people aged 50 plus makes it 
rather difficult to draw strong conclusions. Participants aged 50 plus are, 
however, less likely to enter employment from the programme than 
participants aged 25-49. 
 
7.68. It is unlikely that the hardest-to-help group will face just one 
characteristic that makes them hard-to-help. Multiple disadvantages are likely 
to be evident for many of the ND25 plus client group and it is possible that a 
programme of this nature is inadequate to address a wide range of 
disadvantages in such a short period of time. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
8.1. The national ND25 plus programme has gone through three distinct 
phases with each change increasing the range of provision available to 
participants and the latest change making participation in all stages of the 
programme mandatory for all but older clients. These developments have 
brought the national programme, available from April 2001, more into line with 
pilot provision offered in 28 areas up to March 2001 and also more into line 
with NDYP. 
 
8.2. Under the original national programme NDPAs found the provision 
unsatisfactory relative to that available in pilot areas and for NDYP 
participants. Also, participants in pilot areas experienced a higher degree of 
satisfaction with their interviews with NDPAs than in national areas. There 
was a high level of demand for Gateway activities under the early phases of 
the programme that were not met. Needs assessments of clients were also 
variable and participants felt dissatisfaction when they were participating in 
opportunities where they felt they had no choice and where the opportunities 
were not addressing their needs.  
 
8.3. Many of these issues addressed with enhancements made to the 
programme in April 2000, with a wider range of Gateway provision made 
available, together with more specialist help and guidance and better 
assessment of clients needs. Overall, however, the enhancements were felt to 
be marginal. The programme was reported to be working for some clients, but 
not for the increasing proportion of clients who had poor motivation, very long 
spells of unemployment and severe barriers to finding work. There was also a 
desire from Advisers for more of the programme to be mandatory. 
 
8.4. The re-engineered national programme introduced in April 2001 again 
addressed some of these issues, particularly extending the mandatory 
elements of the programme for clients aged 25-49 and re-structuring the 
programme to provide an individually tailored package of provision for 
participants. There was also greater flexibility for Advisers, which was 
generally welcomed, although issues concerning training for Advisers were 
raised.  
 
8.5. The change to mandatory programme participation after the Gateway 
meant that many more participants took an active role in the programme 
through participation in the IAP and Advisers also felt it deterred some clients 
for continuing their JSA claim.  
 
8.6. There have been some concerns regarding the Follow-through stage of 
the programme with clients having variable requirements from this stage of 
the programme dependent on the extent of their overall needs and what had 
been achieved earlier in the programme. For many the capacity of the Follow-
through was felt to be insufficient, particularly for clients with basic skills 
needs. Roughly two thirds of Follow-through entrants left the Follow-through 
to return to their JSA claim. 
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8.7. Under the original and enhanced national programmes the main active 
provision took place under the AIP or Gateway, but for the re-engineered 
programme, work placements and training opportunities were spilt out into a 
new mandatory IAP. Work experience placements had been a successful 
element of the pilots, but not part of earlier national provision. They were, 
however, adopted and widely used in the re-engineered programme. 
Participation in IAP type activities increased, with clients positive about the 
experience when they felt they had some choice about the activity 
undertaken. The mandatory nature of the IAP was criticised, but it was also 
accepted that it could be beneficial.  
 
8.8. The employer subsidy was widely used under the original and enhanced 
national programmes and less so in the re-engineered programme when work 
placements were more favoured. Employers found the subsidy useful to 
reduce costs particularly smaller employers who found the subsidy vital and 
constituted most New Deal employers. However, many employers reported 
they would have selected the same recruit in the absence of the subsidy.   
 
8.9. Employers were attracted to the 25 plus client group because they had 
more experience, and skills and were considered more reliable than younger 
jobseekers. Problems with clients typically related to lack of motivation, 
substance abuse, a criminal record, language and mental health problems 
and employers were also averse to participants who had had extremely long 
unemployment spells.  
 
8.10. Training providers became a more integral part of the programme in the 
re-engineered programme with the new IAP and also the introduction of the 
routeway model of delivery where providers determined the exact provision 
for clients once Advisers had signalled a general direction. This had led to 
some tensions between Advisers and providers, together with concerns about 
the low number of referrals in the early months of this phase of the 
programme, but after several months the referral rate picked up and tensions 
generally eased.  
 
8.11. Benefit Sanctions also became a more important element with the re-
engineered programme, although were seldom used. There was widespread 
support for sanctions and NDPAs felt they were a useful tool that clients took 
seriously. However, there was a feeling that a 26-week sanction was too 
harsh.   
 
8.12. The quantitative evidence about the programme indicated a modest 
impact of the original national programme. For the pilots at this time, more 
pilot participants left unemployment than participants in national areas, 
although the relative difference between pilot and national participants was 
more modest. There was little indication of an increase in employability based 
on a range of measures and mixed evidence about the quality of jobs that 
ND25 plus participants went into.  
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8.13. Looking at different client groups indicates that early entry is an effective 
policy with more early entrants more going into sustained jobs. At the other 
extreme very long-term unemployed participants, those with five years or 
more unemployment were far less likely to go into jobs.  
 
8.14. The voluntary nature of a lot of the programme for people aged 50 or 
over makes for very different outcomes by age, with younger participants 
more likely to go into work. There were very few differences by gender, and 
for people with and without disabilities. Ethnic minorities entered very different 
opportunities through the IAP than White participants, however, there was 
little difference in the percentage of Whites and ethnic minorities entering 
employment  
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Appendix: Workshop Summaries 
 
On 11 December 2002 a series of workshops were held to discuss the 
findings that emerged from earlier drafts of this report. There were four 
workshops covering: 
 
• Eligibility – facilitated by Chris Hasluck (Institute of Employment 
Relations) 
• Client groups – facilitated by Helen Barnes (Policy Studies Institute) 
• The New Deal Personal Adviser – facilitated by Mark Winterbotham 
(IFF Research Ltd) 
• What works on New Deal 25 plus – facilitated by Alan Marsh (Policy 
Studies Institute) 
 
Each workshop was attended by between 8 and 10 people and the workshops 
were repeated so that overall 16-20 attended a workshop on a particular 
theme. Workshop attendees included researchers responsible for the primary 
research upon which this report is based, DWP researchers, New Deal policy 
officials and regional co-ordinators.  
 
This appendix sets out the opinions expressed in the workshops based on a 
brief summary of reports provided by each of the above workshop facilitators. 
A series of questions relating to each theme were considered although the 
discussions were not restricted to those questions. Material from the 
discussions is omitted here when it is covered in detail in the main body of the 
report.  
 
In the following, the term ‘participant’ refers to a participant in the workshop 
and not a participant on ND25 plus (for who the term ‘client’ is used). 
 
Workshop 1: Eligibility for New Deal 25 plus 
 
There was a considerable degree of agreement between the two workshop 
groups, both in terms of how ND25 plus currently operated and in terms of 
how eligibility may or may not be changed.   
 
Current eligibility 
 
Some participants felt that recent changes in eligibility (reducing eligibility from 
24 months unemployment to 18 months) and the early entry criteria had been 
used to keep up numbers on the programme.  Some participants felt there 
were gains from this reduction in eligibility criteria; clients were somewhat 
more employable because of their earlier entry to the programme.   
 
There appeared to be a consensus that the criteria should remain at 18 
months (out of the last 21) largely on the grounds that there was no evidence 
to support the proposition that a more general early entry would increase job 
entry.  However, one participant suggested that the experience of similar 
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programmes in the Netherlands and Switzerland (where the eligibility 
threshold had been reduced below 18 months) suggested that there were 
significant impacts on helping clients into work.  Notwithstanding, most 
participants believed that a further reduction in general eligibility would merely 
increase numbers on the programme and increase costs. 
 
A view was also expressed that ND25 plus provision should be seen in the 
broader context of other provision for adult Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) 
claimants.  Thus, if a client required basics skills then this should be provided 
via other provision, such as Work Based Learning for Adults (WBLA) that, for 
instance, allowed entry after six months on JSA. 
 
Early entry 
 
There was a general view that eligibility for entry to ND25 plus should remain 
at 18 months, there was also a view that current early entry criteria were too 
specific and did not allow enough discretion to NDPAs. Many participants felt 
that the early entry criteria of ND25 plus should be the same as those on 
NDYP where there was perceived to be a general ‘catch all’ ground for early 
entry where a young person was at a serious disadvantage in the jobs market. 
There was, however, a minority view (one participant) who argued forcefully 
that such discretion already existed but that NDPAs were reluctant to use it or 
unaware that they had such discretion in practice. 
 
Despite the apparent benefits of early entry for some clients, there was little 
support for making early entry other than voluntary.  Mandatory early entry 
would, most argued, be to the detriment of the NDPA-client relationship.  It 
was, however, felt that more clients were coming forward seeking early entry 
partly because provision was seen as having improved.  There was a minority 
view that some client groups could/should be required to enter the programme 
as an early entrant.  Ex-offenders were cited as an example of such a group, 
while any client who had received support from other agencies was another. 
 
Re-entry 
 
Currently, clients who leave ND25 plus are ineligible to re-enter the 
programme for 18 months.  Some participants argued that this was too long a 
gap, especially where the client had only travelled some of the way to being 
employable at the time they left ND25 plus.  If hard to help clients returned to 
JSA there might be a case to allow them to re-enter ND25 plus after, for 
example, six months in order to build on earlier progress.   
 
In-work support 
 
It was felt by some participants that there should be a greater level of ‘in-work 
support’ for clients leaving ND25 plus for a job.  This need had increased as 
the proportion of the client group who were ‘hard to help’ and thus vulnerable 
in work had increased.  Some in-work support was available in the form of 
mentoring, although most participants claimed to be unaware of this provision.  
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Some participants would like to see in-work support being offered as part of a 
separate provision for the hard to help client group. 
 
The future of New Deal 
 
Many participants looked forward to a streamlined New Deal with a common 
Gateway period to which different clients have access at different 
unemployment durations and where provision was driven by client need rather 
than age group.  Some participants would like to see inactive benefit 
recipients also eligible for such a programme and not just JSA claimants. 
 
Workshop 2: Client Groups 
 
Age  
 
There was a strong view that age becomes a disadvantage issue long before 
50 – perhaps as early as 45, or even 40.  The older client group were seen as 
a key group, with provision likely to be affected by legislation in 2006 
outlawing age discrimination in employment.  It was noted that the over 50s 
have had a chequered history within the provision, since the IAP was 
mandatory for the pilots but not in the re-engineered programme.  The effect 
of IAP was noted as being polarising for this group – many got jobs, but many 
left onto other benefits and effectively retired.  Thus intervention could have 
negative effects.  
 
Virtually all participants felt that the different treatment of the 50 plus age 
group was inappropriate.  Almost all felt that the IAP should be mandatory for 
all clients regardless of age. There was some discussion of the upper limit for 
eligibility.  Most participants felt that clients should be eligible for ND25 plus so 
long as they were claiming JSA.  
  
The type of provision that was available was noted as not having always been 
appropriate, particularly for those with considerable work experience. It was 
felt that older people needed to have more account taken of their experience 
and skills, although there was also a need for their skills to be re-focussed 
and linked to available opportunities.  
 
One policy option suggested was of something similar to the function 
Connexions is intended to play for younger people, and like Connexions, it 
was suggested that this could usefully be quite holistic and address issues 
(e.g. ill-health, caring) which affect employability whilst not being traditional 
Jobcentre Plus territory. 
 
It was also suggested that Gateway modules be developed specifically with 
the needs of older workers in mind.  However, both of these policy ideas were 
seen as contingent on there being enough people to take them up in a given 
area – it was thought that this might be problematic in smaller towns and rural 
areas.   
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One person speculated that future cohorts entering ND25 plus may be 
qualitatively different from existing participants, as they will have been 
activated by NDYP – ‘we won’t be finding people who’ve been on benefit for 
18 years’ – another responded more cynically saying that they might still find 
people who haven’t had a job for 18 years, and there isn’t necessarily so 
much difference. 
 
Minority Ethnic Groups 
 
There was felt to be a shortage of provision for those with ESOL needs, and 
that the available courses were too short and not always appropriate (a lack of 
focus on job relevant vocabulary was particularly noted) and it was said that 
many advisers refer to basic skills courses by default, knowing that the person 
really needs ESOL provision which is not available.  It was argued that 
advisers thinking laterally could place workers with ESOL needs in sectors 
(e.g. catering and retail) where this would not be an issue, but that there could 
then be a conflict between short-term and long-term aims in terms of 
employability.  A need to incentivise staff with appropriate skills, such as 
community languages, was also noted. 
 
The Hardest to Help 
 
Much of the remainder of the discussion concerned the hardest to help.  A 
discussion of early entry focused on the need for identifying people who were 
unsuitable to enter ND25 plus and needed to be referred to pre-ND type 
provision well in advance of the time when they would be mandated to enter.  
At the same time, there was a need to avoid deadweight and it would not be 
right to target everyone in this initial period.   
 
The time pressures on advisers were felt to militate against identification of 
those most disadvantaged, particularly regarding issues such as ESOL and 
less obvious forms of disability.  Advisers were also acknowledged to play an 
important gatekeeper role in relation to early entry – only accepting those who 
were likely to obtain a job outcome.  There was felt to be a need for qualitative 
evaluation of early entry and how it operates, in particular the types of 
pressures that lead advisers to skim off those easiest to help.  The high levels 
of motivation implicit in someone seeking out early entry were noted as likely 
to be a key factor affecting current outcomes and therefore extending early 
entry was seen as potentially likely to dilute these. 
 
By the time someone has been unemployed for a long period, it was argued 
that issues relating to self-confidence and self-esteem are hard to disentangle 
from other issues such as benefit disincentives.  Some argued that this group 
fell into two categories – those hardest to help and those who don’t want to 
work.  Others argued that there was not always a clear distinction between 
these. 
 
Other disadvantaged groups 
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It was argued that provision for disadvantaged groups in each area needs to 
be based on a more thorough analysis of local labour markets, and that 
Jobcentre Plus needed to develop a much stronger matching/intermediary 
role with employers.   There was a discussion of StepUp, currently being 
piloted, and this was seen as having a great deal of potential in helping 
people back to work, because it was based on an Intermediate Labour Market 
model.  Although relatively costly, this programme was seen as offering long-
term savings and benefits.  At the same time, one person argued that it was 
important to bear in mind the possible displacement effects if this was rolled 
out nationally.  Others argued that it is acceptable to displace someone who is 
not disadvantaged and can find another job if, by doing so, you give a 
disadvantaged person a chance.   
 
Programmes such as Progress2Work and Hardest to Help (now called P2W 
LinkUP) were seen as highly effective and something which should be rolled 
out as fast as possible. It was suggested that there should be a mechanism 
whereby those accepted onto such a programme could have a deferred entry 
onto ND25 plus.   
 
There was a discussion of the relative merits of marketing the benefits of 
specialist provision versus mandating before 18 months, with the general 
balance of views favouring the former.  It was felt that those with chaotic 
lifestyles would be unlikely to follow the programme in a straightforward 
sequential way, and that there should be provision for ‘time-out’ periods 
(these apparently do already exist in relation to Progress2Work) while at the 
same time not allowing too much drift and maintaining overall control and a 
focus on the end goals of the programme.  Underpinning this whole 
discussion was an implicit tension between the idea of ND25 plus as a 
mainstream programme (and the extent to which special needs should be 
referred outside of it) and a tacit recognition that, to some extent, it functions 
as residual provision, in that most of those having recourse to it have 
significant disadvantages of some kind. 
 
A whole raft of issues in relation to basic skills were identified. These included 
concerns about the effectiveness of screening in Jobcentre Plus, problems 
encouraging take-up of provision, the quality and availability of provision 
(particularly availability of follow-on provision after the initial course) and the 
needs of people with a complex mix of ESOL and basic skills issues, who are 
not literate in their first language (mainly refugees).  There was felt to be a 
need for a model curriculum with better funding; one which is less closely tied 
to job outcomes and more flexible in terms of the length of courses.  It was 
hoped that the recent appointment of basic skills co-ordinators would help to 
address some of these issues.  A question was also raised about the 
effectiveness of ESOL training provided under WBLA and it was argued that 
this should be made more widely available if it is of good quality, not least as 
refugees already have access to it. 
 
Advisers 
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Advisers were generally acknowledged to be pivotal to the whole process, 
and the whole structure of incentives for advisers and for clients was felt to be 
important.  NDPAs were seen as having training issues in relation to the 
identification of acute or multiple disadvantages.  The targets and caseloads 
also needed to be adjusted to take account of the degree of complexity 
involved.  Some people argued that the advisers work would be made easier 
if they were allowed to work with some groups on a non-mandatory basis, 
while others felt that the ethos of compulsion was quite central to the 
organisation and did not represent a problem for advisers.  There was felt to 
be a need for advisers to develop specialist knowledge, and it was argued 
that they might usefully be provided with additional incentives for doing so. 
The development of the senior adviser role was seen to go some way in this 
direction.   
 
There was also a discussion of the different degrees of flexibility available to 
advisers under different regimes – Employment Zones (EZ) versus Jobcentre 
Plus and Action Teams.  The tailored help possible under EZ was felt to make 
it easier to tap into individual clients’ motivations – examples were given of 
funding driving lessons, of rewarding individual initiatives by allowing amounts 
saved by sourcing items at reduced prices to build towards a bonus and so 
on.  In general, it was felt that EZ assistance could more easily incorporate an 
element of ‘reward’ (like a TV) when someone got a job, rather than being 
only for things directly related to the job (such as clothes or tools).  In this 
context, someone also mentioned an idea that had been mooted of a ‘reward 
card’ type initiative for NDLP.    EZ were felt to encourage lateral thinking, 
outreach and a ‘can-do mentality’ compared to the much more bureaucratic 
attitudes fostered in advisers under Jobcentre Plus.  
 
An example of the bureaucratic mindset was presented by a lively discussion 
about the issues of ‘points’ allocated to particular types of clients at 
Jobcentres which were seen to be a significant source of disincentives for 
advisers to work with certain groups, such as the over 50s.  The issue of 
‘multiple points for multiple problems’ was raised but not really felt to be 
practicable (the first workshop group felt this issue was more important than 
the second group). Job targets, in particular, were seen as a key driver 
affecting advisers.  The issue of how to measure client progress/increased 
employability as an outcome was also mentioned in this context. 
 
Workshop 3: The role of the NDPA 
 
There was general recognition that the NDPA role is central to the ND25 plus 
programme and the programme’s success depends on how well this role is 
being fulfilled. One person commented that if the outcomes on the programme 
are at the 35-40 per cent level as indicated in the report then the conclusion to 
be drawn is that NDPAs must be working effectively. That said, in the other 
workshop one attendee commented that no one has figures on exactly how 
many NDPAs there are on 25 plus nationally, and hence, evaluating their 
overall effectiveness of the programme in terms of the role played by NDPAs 
is not straightforward.  The issue of top slicing was also raised – it being 
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unclear the extent to which money intended for advisers is being spent on 
advisers. 
 
Re-engineering of the programme has moved NDPAs closer to centre stage, 
and more and more is being asked of them. A wide range of skills are seen as 
required for the job (knowledge of the local economy and jobs situations, 
counselling, being able to listen, motivate and persuade, organisation skills, to 
be on top of the processes and systems, knowledge of drugs and alcohol 
issues etc). One commented that if they had all the skills we expect (or want) 
them to have they wouldn’t be NDPAs (they’d be able to get much more 
lucrative work). 
 
Successful changes to ND25 Plus 
 
Areas within the enhancements and re-engineering of ND25 plus affecting 
advisers and seen to be successful are: 
 
• (the move to) weekly sessions and the opportunity this gives to build up 
a rapport with clients 
• the greater focus on client responsibilities, as well as a shift away from 
the softly softly approach 
• action planning which has given greater structure to the whole process 
• the greater range of tools available to NDPAs to help clients 
• increased flexibility for NDPAs (the ADF was felt to be both popular 
with NDPAs and being used to the benefit of clients) 
 
With regard to the idea of flexibility for advisers and the ability to tailor 
provision to the needs of the individual, there was a widespread feeling that 
they have grabbed this opportunity by the horns. Others put the point in terms 
of them having done as much as they are allowed by the programme, and 
often the room for flexibility and tailoring depended on local provision. 
 
Areas of continuing concern in ND25 Plus 
 
Some issues / areas working less well regarding advisers and their role in the 
ND25 plus process, or hindering even better performance were felt to be:  
 
• High levels of staff turnover is seen as a major issue that needs 
consideration. Losing experienced advisers is hindering the 
achievement of higher job outcomes from the programme given the 
number of new and inexperienced advisers that have to be brought in. 
Turnover results in part from burnout in what is agreed to be a difficult 
and demanding job. One ex-adviser spoke about how this often sets in 
when they start seeing clients coming back for their second or third 
spell on the programme. High turnover also reflects a lack of obvious 
career progression in the role, something that the advent of the senior 
adviser role had only partially resolved, however, the added financial 
and other benefits for a senior adviser were felt to be limited. 
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• Professional development, career development, and the re-design of 
the NDPA role were seen as areas where attention was needed (there 
was some comments that work is being done in this area with 
occupational psychologists looking at the job design of the NDPA 
position). Career progression, recognition and kudos, training and 
qualifications, rewards (both higher pay to better reflect what is being 
asked of them and possibly greater uses of incentives) and the 
potential need for job rotation to reduce burnout were some of the 
issues that participants felt needed to be addressed. 
 
Example comments on these issues included: 
• NDPAs targets for placements being set too high (and being de-
motivating for many) 
• advisers having little incentive to perform well (the low payments 
awarded for high box marking; achieving an NVQ leads to a small one-
off payment) 
• with regard to career development and progression, the dilemma is 
how to avoid the situation where progress for an adviser means they 
leave the advisory role 
 
Barriers to better performance 
 
A number of barriers were discussed in relation to aspects of the role that 
acted against NDPAs being able to do an even better job. These included: 
 
New Deal in general (not ND25 plus specifically) was seen as involving 
NDPAs in a vast amount of often unnecessary paperwork (people spoke 
about the bureaucracy, duplication of processes, audit trails, the complexity 
and the lack of harmonisation between the different New Deal programmes). 
In the latter area work is being done to bring some of the different New Deal 
programmes closer together, but there is felt to be a general need for 
simplification of the processes. The paperwork and bureaucracy were seen as 
reducing the amount of time NDPAs were spending on the key aspects of 
their job of trying to get clients into work. It was generally de-motivating for 
advisers. 
 
These issues all contributed to NDPAs experiencing severe pressures on their 
time. It was recognised for example that advisers found it difficult to find time 
to get to know their training providers and local employers, despite this being 
a key part of the job. Without this, one attendee commented, how can 
advisers possibly put the ideal programme together for an individual? Links 
with, and knowledge, of providers were generally felt to be improving, 
although there was still some way to go in this regard. 
 
Multi-functioning, with advisers working in other roles rather than working 
exclusively on ND25 plus, was seen as being far from ideal (although 
inevitable in smaller offices), and making the role ‘piecemeal’. Greater 
harmonisation between different New Deal programmes should help this to 
some degree since part of the problem currently for those working on different 
programmes are the differences between each programme. 
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The training NDPAs have received to date was often seen as being of 
variable quality. One of the workshops felt that the balance of the training had 
possibly focussed on systems and processes rather than developing skills 
needed in helping the 25 plus client group back to work (e.g. it would have 
been preferable to give greater weight to such issues as diagnosis of clients 
barriers, more on identifying drink and drugs issues). The other workshop 
group appeared to think the reverse, that skills training has been fine but 
product knowledge training has not been great. Generally though workshop 
attendees were unsure what training NDPAs received initially or continued to 
receive, or the extent to which this was standard across districts. 
 
Some participants felt that the IT support systems were reasonable (and 
certainly improvements had been made) while others felt they were often a 
hindrance and not fit for purpose (e.g. information out of date, a lack of user-
friendliness). Some commented that some of these issues were being looked 
at currently, although no one was sure if advisers were being consulted as to 
their needs in regard to the systems. 
  
Other issues raised 
 
• It was mentioned that there may be a need for more specialist advisers 
(e.g. specialising or having extra training in identifying drug or alcohol 
issues, or mental health issues, or responsible for links with NHS). 
 
• The balance between autonomy for advisers and ensuring policy is 
adhered to is seen as something of a balancing act. The former 
explains part of the success of the programme although there is 
evidence that programme effectiveness matches the extent to which 
the programme guidelines are being adhered to.  
 
• Good management of advisers is very important. 
 
• How, and even if, best practice is shared between advisers is not clear. 
More (formal) opportunities for this would contribute to (a sense of) 
professional development within the adviser role. 
 
• All the issues discussed are not specific to advisers on ND25 plus, they 
are very similar for advisers on any of the New Deal programmes 
dealing with long term unemployed clients. 
 
 
Workshop 4: What works best on New Deal 25 plus 
 
The two groups differed in their opinion of what works best in the programme. 
The first placed emphasis on the mandatory IAP under the re-engineered 
programme and the second on the Gateway Period.  
 
Those emphasising the IAP drew attention to the increased focus of the PA-
Client relationship and the tight 13-week focus, which can be structured into a 
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plan for the client to follow and the PA to monitor and support. The use of 
case conferences was also seen as a key element of the programme 
 
On the other hand, those participants who emphasised the Gateway drew 
attention to the 2-week Gateway to Work courses that were originally 
designed for under 25s but seem to offer a lot to over 25s as well.  
 
The increased regularity of the meetings between the client and the NDPA 
were also perceived as being especially effective, although this is not always 
possible. The use of Senior Advisers to support NDPAs, conduct case 
conferences and inject the required structure, pace and purpose into the office 
effort was considered vital to the success of the re-engineered programme. 
 
Both groups agreed that ND25 plus does not do enough for the hardest to 
help and the most disadvantaged. This arises from a number of weaknesses:  
 
• Initial assessments were often weak and undirected and NDPAs were 
insufficiently well-trained to deal with sick and disabled clients.  
• Basic skills training was not up to scratch: the courses available were 
usually too short, too generalised, and insufficiently tailored to real 
knowledge of local labour market opportunities.  
• Training and related service providers are very good at spotting the 
hardest cases early on but can do little for them, mainly because they 
hold out only small promise of the incentive payments attached to 
getting people into unsubsidised employment.  
 
Recommendations 
 
A number of suggested improvements/recommendation came out of the 
discussions. These included the need for: 
 
• more focussed specialist provision 
• NDPAs and specialist providers to work in close concert 
• greater engagement with employers 
• improved training of NDPAs to deal with sick and disabled clients 
• All clients to have regular meetings with NDPAs and for NDPAs to 
engage with them effectively 
• case conferences to be held promptly and to be properly recorded and 
acted on. 
 
Discussion returned to the central importance of the NDPA-client relationship 
and the clear effectiveness of good NDPAs. Greater investment in NDPA 
training, mentoring, selective recruitment, and developed career structure is 
therefore likely to be rewarded by improved performance of ND25 plus. 
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